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For almost half a century, scholars, judges and politicians have debated two competing 
models of the judiciary’s role in a democratic society.  The mainstream model views courts as 
arbiters of disputes between private individuals asserting particular rights.1  As former Reagan 
Administration Solicitor General Charles Fried wrote, “courts should be the impartial tool for 
doing justice between man and man.”2
The reform upsurge of the 60s and 70s witnessed a transformation in the role of the 
judiciary, particularly the federal judiciary.  Courts were now often viewed not merely as forums 
to settle private disputes, but as instruments of societal change.  Harvard Professor Abram 
Chayes termed the emerging model one of “public law litigation.”3  This new model emphasized 
the court’s power to remedy structural, constitutional or statutory violations; as Professor Chayes 
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1See, e.g., Lon Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353 
(1978); MORRIS RAPHAEL COHEN, LAW AND THE SOCIAL ORDER 251-52 (1933).
2CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAW 57 (1991).
3Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 
(1976); see also Owen Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Foreward:  The Forms of Justice, 
93 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1979).
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put it:  “the centerpiece of the emerging public law model is the decree.”4  The difference 
in relief between the two models was not itself decisive, what was fundamental to the 
new conception was the judiciary’s role in implementing social change and not simply 
ordering private relationships.  As one prominent critic perceived it, the new model urged 
that lawsuits “be recast so they would not just be disputes between individuals over their 
particular grievances, but political struggles in which judges could reorder whole 
institutions and change the fundamental nature of society.”5
The ongoing debate between these two views of the judicial role has obscured a 
third model of the role of courts in a democratic society; a model that has been ignored 
by legal scholars and viewed as illegitimate by some courts.  That third, alternative 
perspective views courts as forums for protest.  Under this model, courts not only 
function as adjudicators of private disputes, or institutions that implement social reforms, 
but as arenas in which political and social movements utilize to agitate for and educate 
about their legal and political agenda.
While victory is an important index of success in the first two views of the role of 
litigation, winning in court is not salient in the forums of protest model.  Of course, the 
litigators and their clients certainly hope, and at times expect to win in court; but their 
objective is broader than courtroom victory.  They primarily seek neither the damages 
awarded to private litigators under the traditional model, nor the injunction of the public 
4Chayes, supra note 3, at 1298.  But see Abram Chayes, Foreword:  Public Law 
Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 HARV. L. REV. 4, 58 (1982) (noting that it is the 
nature of the controversy, the sources of the governing law, and the consequent impact of 
the decision–rather than the form of relief–that differentiate public law from private law 
adjudication).
5FRIED, supra note 2, at 16.
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law model, but rather to use the courtroom struggle to build a political movement.  The 
litigation can serve a variety of roles:  to articulate a constitutional theory supporting the 
aspirations of the political movement, to expose the conflict between the aspirations of 
law and its grim reality, to draw public attention to the issue and to mobilize an oppressed 
community, or to put public pressure on a recalcitrant government or private institution to 
take a popular movement’s grievances seriously.  What is decisive is that judicial relief 
not be viewed as dispositive:  such relief is important but not the driving force of the 
litigation.
This model thus breaks down the traditional barrier between law and politics, but 
in a fundamentally different way than the law reform model.  The traditional model 
attempts to shield the judicial process from the supposedly unsavory influence of politics, 
while the law reform model views politics as a necessary predicate to the courtroom 
drama.  In this third model, the relationship between law and politics is reversed:  a 
significant point of many of the cases is to inspire political action.  The legal struggle is 
thus a part of a broader political campaign, not the engine of change itself.  Courts are not 
the prime movers of social change, they are one forum in which the struggle for societal 
change takes place.  Even when public interest lawsuits prevail in court, often their most 
lasting legacy is not the relief ordered by the court, but the lawsuit’s contribution to the 
ongoing community discourse about an important public issue.
Some courts have questioned whether litigation brought for the purpose of 
provoking public dialogue and debate is legitimate.  For example, the Appeals for the 
District of Columbia imposed Rule 11 sanctions on the attorneys for fifty-five Libyan 
citizens and residents who sued for damages resulting from the 1986 United States air 
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strike on Libya.6  Although the District Court found that plaintiffs’ counsel, including the 
former United States Attorney General Ramsey Clark, “surely knew” that “the case 
offered no hope whatsoever of success,” and that it had been “brought as a public 
statement of protest” against President Reagan’s actions,7 it declined to impose Rule 11 
sanctions because federal courts “serve in some respects as a forum for making such 
statements, and should continue to do so.”8  The court of appeals, however, held that Rule 
11 sanctions were warranted because “[w]e do not conceive it a proper function of a 
federal court to serve as a forum for ‘protests.’”9
Commentators have criticized the court of appeals’ decision.10  Yet even some 
forceful critics agree that courts do not exist as public forums.11  But as this Article 
demonstrates, from the early history of the American Republic onward, political 
movements have used courts to further public debate on important constitutional issues.  
Indeed, as one commentator has noted, a “considerable amount of civil rights litigation” 
is in some sense a “public statement of protest.”12
6Saltany v. Reagan, 886 F.2d 438 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (per curiam) (Buckley, 
Ginsburg, and Sentelle), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 932 (1990).
7Saltany v. Reagan, 702 F. Supp. 319, 322 (D.D.C. 1988).
8Id.
9Saltany, 886 F.2d at 440.
10Anthony D’Amato, The Imposition of Attorney Sanctions for Claims Arising 
From the U.S. Air Raid on Libya, 84 AM. J. INT’L L. 705 (1990); Carl Tobias, Rule 11 
Recalibrated in Civil Rights Cases, 26 VILL. L. REV. 105, 118-19 (1991).
11D’Amato, supra note 10, at 706.
12Tobias, supra note 10, at 119.
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 In recent years, groups at both ends of the legal and political spectrum have used 
courts as arenas to provoke public education.  The lawsuit now pending before the United 
States Supreme Court challenging the Bush Administration’s detention of prisoners at 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, has as an important goal sparking national and international 
outcry against these unlawful detentions.13  African American activists have filed 
reparations lawsuits against corporations whose histories are entangled with slavery, as 
well as the United States government, seeking to generate “societal discussion” about the 
role commercial entities and the government played in the slave trade and slavery.14
Lawyers for Haitian refugees challenged various aspects of the Coast Guard’s 
interdiction and return of Haitian refugees,15 with an important goal being to keep the 
13Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55 (D.D.C. 2002); Al Odah et al. v. United 
States of America, 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 534 (2003).  
I am Vice President of the Center for Constitutional Rights, the organization that 
represents the plaintiffs in the Rasul case, and have been involved in that case.
14Nathan Kauffman & Kenneth R. Gosselin, The Hartford, Suits Certain to Stir 
Debate on Reparation; Legal Experts Say Airing Issue is Worth It, Whether Actions Win 
or Lose, PITT. POST-GAZETTE, Apr. 7, 2002, at A10; Tony Pugh, Maureen Fan & Ken 
Moritsuqu, First Suit by Slave Descendant Seeks Reparations, PITT. POST-GAZETTE, 
Mar. 27, 2002, at A10 (lawsuits important for providing a forum for plaintiffs’ political 
and historical arguments).  See also Note, Political Interest Convergence:  African 
American Reparations and the Image of American Democracy, 25 U. HAW. L. REV. 253, 
262 (2002) citing plaintiffs’ complaint in Farmer-Paellmann v. Fleetboston Financial 
Corp. Inc. (E.D.N.Y., Mar. 26, 2002) and other reparations cases and arguing that the 
complaints play a valuable role to “invite discussion and debate.”  Cato v. United States, 
70 F.3d 1103, 1105 (9th Cir. 1995); Obadele v. United States, 53 Fed. Cl. 432 (2002); 
Johnson v. United States, 1994 WL 225179 (N.D. Cal. 1994); Scott v. Comptroller of the 
Treasury, 659 A.2d 341 (Md. 1994).  See also Note, Bridging the Color Line:  The Power 
of African American Reparation to Redirect America’s Future, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1689 
(2002).
15Michael Ratner, How We Closed the Guantanamo HIV Camp:  The Intersection 
of Politics and Litigation, 11 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 187, 193 (1998); Harold Hongju Koh, 
The “Haiti Paradigm” in United States Human Rights Policy, 103 YALE L.J. 2391, 2401 
(1994) [hereinafter Koh, Haiti Paradigm].
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refugee issue alive politically.16  During the Vietnam War, countless lawsuits were filed 
with an aim to focus the public on the unconstitutional nature of the U.S. war in 
Indochina,17 and more recent wars have inspired similar lawsuits.18
Conservative political groups and individuals have also attempted to use the 
courts as forums to generate public attention over particular issues.  The backers of the 
Paula Jones case undoubtedly brought and continued that litigation to advance 
conservative political causes and embarrass President Clinton.19  Anti-abortion activists 
have supported legislation, concluding that even if they lose the ensuing court challenge 
over its constitutionality, that battle would be valuable in educating the American people 
to their point of view on abortion.20  Gun owners have used the courts to get public 
attention to their Second Amendment concerns.21
Recognizing the legitimacy of litigation brought to spark public debate on an 
issue, to galvanize a political movement or to spotlight social injustice would have 
16Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council Inc., 509 U.S. 155 (1993).
17See, e.g., Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
18Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19 (D.C. Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 815 
(2000); Doc v. Bush, 323 F.3d 133 (1st Cir. 2003); Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141 
(D.D.C. 1990).
19Carol Rice Andrews, Jones v. Clinton:  A Study in Politically Motivated Suits, 
Rule 11 and the First Amendment , 2001 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1.  President Clinton alleged that 
it was a “politically inspired lawsuit.”  Jones v. Clinton, 36 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1123 (E.D. 
Ark. 1999).
20See Richard Stevenson, Bush Signs Ban on a Procedure for Abortions, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 6, 2003, at A1; Robert Toner, For GOP It’s a Moment, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 
2003, at A1.
21Michael Janofsky, Gun Owners Takes Their Concerns to Court, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 20, 2002, at A10.
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several important impacts on courts, lawyers, and social movements.  First, it requires 
narrowing the judicial definition of frivolous or improper litigation subject to Rule 11 
sanctions.  More importantly, accepting this perspective requires litigants and lawyers to 
assess the appropriateness of a given legal strategy not solely by the likelihood of success 
in court, but also by the role it plays in advancing a popular movement.22  Most 
fundamentally it requires looking at law reform litigation and often even private litigation 
in terms of its interaction and interface with political movements and not as an isolated 
legal struggle.  This perspective not only brings politics the courtroom, but drags the 
courtroom into the outside political world.
Part I of this article contrasts the traditional and structural reform model of 
litigation with what I term the Public Forum Model of Law Reform Litigation.  Part II 
demonstrates that this type of litigation has a lengthy pedigree in American history.  Part 
III focuses on the First Amendment values promoted by this form of litigation and the 
protection it should be accorded.  Part IV addresses the implications of this analysis for 
how judges might address the tensions between judicial articulation of norms and 
enforcement of those norms that are ever-present in law reform litigation and form an 
important area of controversy over the public law model.  Part V will evaluate the 
broader implications for lawyers and their clients of using courts in the fashion, 
evaluating the pitfalls and advantages of such a use of litigation and the possible tensions 
between law and politics it raises.
I. Law Reform Litigation and the Courts as Forums for Protest Model
22See ARTHUR KINOY, RIGHTS ON TRIAL 71 (1983).
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 The successful law reform litigation of the 1950s and 60s spawned an ongoing 
debate among scholars over the legitimacy and efficacy of judicially imposed reforms.  
Legal scholars focused on the legitimacy of this litigation.  In seminal articles, Professor 
Abram Chayes and Owen Fiss argued that structural, public law litigation was displacing 
the traditional dispute resolution lawsuit as the dominant form of adjudication in the late 
twentieth century.23  The traditional model of adjudication posited a bipolar conflict 
between individual private parties before a neutral, detached, mostly passive judge to 
determine whether a legal right had been violated and damages should be awarded.  The 
point of such a lawsuit was to decide a concrete grievance or dispute, not to address some 
general problem of public policy.
The public structural lawsuit on the other hand contained a multiplicity of parties 
and interests, often taking the form of a class action.  It was not a dispute about private 
rights, but rather over issues of public policy.  The fact inquiry was not simply 
retrospective but predictive and thus quasi-legislative.  Most important, the judge was not 
a passive, detached arbiter, but rather an active agent who shaped and organized the 
litigation to ensure a just and workable outcome.  The relief imposed was not damages 
but an injunctive decree that often required ongoing judicial supervision.24  The function 
of this structural, public lawsuit was not to accord damages for a discrete private wrong, 
but rather to change the behavior of a large bureaucratic organization.
Both Chayes and Fiss viewed the rise of the structural lawsuit as linked to the 
development of a regulatory, administrative bureaucratic state.  The dispute resolution 
23Chayes, supra note 3; Fiss, supra note 3.
24Chayes, supra note 3, at 1302; Fiss, supra note 3, at 18-28.
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model was based on a system of autonomous, individual entrepreneurs operating in the 
largely unregulated marketplace; the structural reform lawsuit reflects a world in which 
the state, corporations and large bureaucracies play dominant roles.  In this modern 
world, the role of federal courts was transformed from primarily solving private disputes, 
to policing the interface between large state institutions, such as schools, prisons, and 
child welfare systems, and the citizenry.25
The legitimacy of the court’s role in restructuring institutions has come under 
persistent attack.  Some criticize the federal judiciary’s move away from concrete 
“grievance answering” to more generalized problem solving.26  Alexander Bickel 
complained that “All too many federal judges have been induced to view themselves as 
holding roving commissions as problem solvers, and as charged with a duty to act when 
majoritarian institutions do not.”27  Many viewed judges as grabbing the “imperial” 
power to thwart the will of majoritarian, more democratic organs of government.28
The courts and Congress have also battled over the appropriateness of the reform 
litigation.  Justice Powells’ influential concurrence in United States v. Richardson
reflected the concerns of the Burger and Rehnquist Court regarding structural reform 
litigation:29
25Chayes, supra note 3, at 1304; Fiss, supra note 3, at 44.
26DONALD HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 7-9 (1977).
27ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 134 
(1970).
28RAUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY, THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1977).
29418 U.S. 166, 192 (1974).
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[Due] to what many have regarded as the unresponsiveness of the Federal 
Government to recognized needs or serious inequities in our society, 
recourse to the federal courts has attained an unprecedented popularity in 
recent decades.  Those courts have often acted as a major instrument of 
social reform. . . . [w]e risk a progressive impairment of the effectiveness 
of the federal courts if their limited resources are diverted increasingly 
from their historic role to the resolution of public-interest suits brought by 
litigants who cannot distinguish themselves from all taxpayers or all 
citizens. . . .  It merits noting how often and how unequivocally the Court 
has expressed its antipathy to efforts to convert the Judiciary into an open 
forum for the resolution of political or ideological disputes about the 
performance of government.
Congress has fought over a host of proposals to limit federal courts jurisdiction to hear 
and remedy institutional reform cases, and has enacted legislation to limit prison 
litigation30 and to restrict the ability of Legal Services Lawyers to engage in class action 
or other structural reform cases.31
While the traditional dispute resolution model of adjudication and its more recent 
structural reform competitor are widely divergent, they have some basic similarities.  
Both are jurocentric.  They focus on the judge as the central actor in resolving disputes.  
Fiss’ “conception of adjudication starts from the top—the office of the judge—and works 
down. . . .  At the core of structural reform is the judge, and his effort to give meaning to 
30Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (2004).
31See, e.g., Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001).
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our public values.”32  So too, while the dispute resolution model accords the judge a more 
passive role, it also is fundamentally concerned with defining the role of the judge.33  In 
addition, both models see the judicial grant of relief as critical to the lawsuit, whether it 
be the award of damages or the implementation of a decree.
Important, recent work of social scientists raises questions about both the 
traditional legal model and its structural reform competitor.  In the 1970s and 80s 
political and social scientists engaged in a debate, parallel to the legal dispute, over the 
legitimacy of law reform litigation.  The social science discussion did not focus primarily 
on the proper role of the courts or the competence of the judiciary to restructure political 
or social institutions.  Rather, social scientists debated the question of whether the 
judiciary’s decisions really had the effect of changing society.
The publication of Gerald Rosenberg’s Hollow Hope sparked the debate.  
Rosenberg argued that the federal courts—even in such celebrated cases as Brown v. 
Board of Education and Roe v. Wade—were largely ineffectual—and perhaps even 
counterproductive—in producing social change.  Rosenberg concluded that “U.S. courts 
can almost never be effective producers of significant social reform.”34  To Rosenberg 
“courts act as a ‘fly paper’ for social reformers who succumb to the ‘lure of litigation.’”35
32Fiss, supra note 3, at 17, 41.
33Edward L. Rubin, Passing Through the Door:  Social Movement Literature and 
Legal Scholarship, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 58 (2001) (“The jurocentric approach to legal 
scholarship is best exemplified by the legal process school.”); Anthony Sebok, Legal 
Realism and Legal Process:  Reading the Legal Process, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1571, 1584 
(1996) (Hart and Sacks most interested in work of judges).
34GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE 338 (1991) (emphasis in original).
35Id.
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Rosenberg’s conclusions have been challenged by a host of social scientists.  
Most of these academics agree with Rosenberg that judicial decisions by themselves 
rarely lead to social change, and that reliance on courts and judges often proves 
counterproductive for political and social movements.  These social scientists focused, 
however, on the indirect effects of litigation.  For scholars such as Michael McCann, 
Stuart Schiengold and Joel Handler, who studied social movements, the indirect effects 
and uses of litigation may be its most important aspect for social movements seeking 
change.36  Social movements’ use of litigation to mobilize political struggles, to gain 
favorable publicity, to build a political movement, to generate support for political and 
constitutional claims and to provide leverage to supplement other tactics and force the 
opposition to settle is the central thrust of these scholars’ work.  This body of work 
argues that “although the litigation by itself may not always produce immediate and 
sweeping results, it can function as part of an effective political strategy for achieving 
social reform.”37  Empirical studies in such disparate areas as pay equity reform 
litigation,38 disability rights cases,39 school financial reform litigation,40 environmental 
36MICHAEL MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK:  PAY EQUITY REFORM AND THE POLITICS 
OF LEGAL MOBILIZATION 10 (1994); JOEL F. HANDLER, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE 
LEGAL SYSTEM 210 (1978); STUART A. SCHIENGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS:  
LAWYERS, PUBLIC POLICY, AND POLITICAL CHANGE (1974).
37SUSAN GLUCK MEZEY, PITIFUL PLAINTIFFS:  CHILD WELFARE LITIGATION AND 
THE FEDERAL COURTS 5-6 (2000).
38MCCANN, supra note 36.
39Susan M. Olson, The Political Evolution of Interest Group Litigation, in
GOVERNING THROUGH COURTS 225 (Richard A.L. Gambiatta et al. eds., 1981).
40Richard A.L. Gambiatta, Litigation, Judicial Deference and Policy Change, in
GOVERNING THROUGH COURTS, supra note 39, at 259.
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and consumer litigation,41 or civil rights organizing42 have demonstrated the significant 
indirect benefits that litigation can achieve for plaintiffs who use courts to mobilize 
public sentiment or provide leverage for their claims.  This social science research must 
be integrated into the debate among legal scholars over the proper role of the federal 
judiciary.
A. The Courts as Forums for Protest Model
The work of these social scientists requires that legal scholars conceptualize an 
alternative, third model of litigation, not to displace but to exist alongside the traditional 
dispute resolution and law reform models.  If the most important effect of even winning 
law reform cases may not lie in the judicial relief awarded, but in the indirect effects of 
the litigation on society, than a reconceptualization of the Chayes/Fiss law reform 
paradigm is necessary.
41HANDLER, supra note 36, at 69, 97.
42Francesca Polletta, The Structural Context of Novel Rights Claims:  Southern 
Civil Rights Organizing 1961-1966, 34 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 367, 385-86 (2000).
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What I term the Courts as Forums for Protest model would have several key 
characteristics that would distinguish it from both of the other two prominent paradigms.
1. Winning or Losing in Court is Not as Important as Influencing the 
Public Debate
The lawyers’ and plaintiffs’ interest in the lawsuit is not solely, nor at times even 
primarily, winning or losing, but in getting their message out to the broader public or a 
particular group.  The lawsuit serves as a means for the plaintiffs and counsel to 
transform the court into a forum to broadcast their point of view.  While the plaintiffs do 
have a legal claim that they believe is valid and they want the court to decide, they also 
want to use the litigation as a vehicle for their protest, as a catalyst for aiding or 
developing a broader social movement.
The efficacy of lawsuits in generating publicity has been well documented.  Many 
social scientists have observed “that litigation is one of the most effective ways to win 
publicity for a cause.”43  Public interest litigators and organizations have come to view 
litigation as a vehicle of attracting the media.  Reflecting this recognition, it is now a 
common practice to announce a pending or filed public interest lawsuit by means of a 
press conference.44  Often litigation attracts the media’s attention in a way that nothing 
else does.45  Professor Joel Handler concluded that in general “a 20 page complaint and a 
temporary injunction are worth more than a 300 page report in the media.”46  Professor 
43MCCANN, supra note 36, at 58.
44A LEXIS search of a six-month period between July 1 and December 31, 2003 
revealed at least 45 lawsuits that were announced by way of a press conference.
45MCCANN, supra note 36, at 58-62.
46HANDLER, supra note 36, at 216.
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Handler discusses a category of litigation he studied where “the tactic that distinguishes 
these cases is that the law reformers do not expect to achieve results through court or 
administrative order:  such proceedings take too long or become too costly . . . .  Rather, 
they use legal proceedings to generate harmful publicity that will force the discriminator 
into a settlement.”47
The educational value of litigation is often substantial even where the case does 
not result in a legal victory.  Professor McMann demonstrates that pay equity advocates 
used lawsuits as a “crucial organizing tool,” and that for many of the activists “whether 
you win or lose [in court], awareness rises through this type of action.”48  For McCann, 
while the pay equity litigation resulted in only modest policy reforms, perhaps the single 
most important achievement of the movement was the transformations in many working 
women’s consciousness, understanding and commitments.49  Similarly, Professor Richard 
Gambiatta studied the impact of the school finance case that lost in the Supreme Court 
and concluded that the impact of the litigation nevertheless influenced the legislative 
agenda.  Thus even ultimately defeated litigation “can recast the nature of a debate, 
facilitate debates that otherwise may not occur, thus setting in motion, at times, the 
process of policy change.”50
47Id. at 214.
48MCCANN, supra note 36, at 70-71.
49Id. at 230.
50Gambiatta, supra note 40, at 277.  Professor John Denvir demonstrated that 
ineffective litigation against racial discrimination in voting spurred Congress to enact to 
1965 Voting Rights Act.  John Denvir, Towards a Political Theory of Public Interest 
Litigation, 54 N.C. L. REV. 1133, 1140 (1976).
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This social science research is buttressed by the experience of the bar.  For 
example, William Colby, the Cruzan family’s attorney in their famous “right-to-die case” 
that lost in the Supreme Court explained:
The public discourse surrounding the cases quickly took on a life of its 
own.  The true legacy of the two cases is that they caused [the country] to 
talk about death, dying, living wills, hospital ethics committees, and the 
withdrawal of futile medical treatment and who should make that decision.  
This nationwide discussion very quickly outgrew the individual lawsuits 
of two young girls involved in car accidents.51
Similarly, Yale Professor Harold Koh’s experience in transnational public law 
litigation led him to view such litigation “as a development whose success should be 
measured not by favorable judgments, but by practical results:  the norms declared, the 
political pressure generated, the government practices abated, and the lives saved.”52  For 
Koh, even “adverse Supreme Court decisions are no longer final stops, but only way 
stations, in the process of ‘complex enforcement . . . .’”53
The recent litigation involving the suspected Taliban and Al Qaida prisoners 
indefinitely detained by the Bush Administration at the U.S. military installation at 
Guantanamo Bay without any legal process is but another example.  Until recently, the 
51William H. Colby, Media and the “Right to Die” A Personal Reflection, 14 
REV. LITIG. 619 (1995), quoted in Edwin Chemerinsky, Silence is Not Golden:  
Protecting Lawyer Speech Under the First Amendment, 47 EMORY L.J. 859, 870-71 
(1998).
52Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE L.J. 2347, 
2371-72 (1991).
53Koh, Haiti Paradigm, supra note 15, at 2406.
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lower courts had uniformly rejected prisoners’ petitions for habeas corpus relief.  
Nonetheless, the litigation received a significant amount of press attention and helped 
keep the issue in the public eye for almost two years.  Now the Supreme Court has taken 
the case and will hear it this year.  But whether they win or lose in the Supreme Court, 
the plaintiffs have already achieved a key goal of focusing public attention on the 
government’s policy.
2. A Non-Jurocentic Model of Litigation
As already noted, both the traditional dispute resolution model and the 
Chayes/Fiss structural or reform model of litigation focused on the role of the judge.  The 
recent social science research has concentrated not on the top-down model of judges
dispensing decisions to the litigants, but on a more bottom-up, decentralized model that 
analyzes the interaction between the parties to the litigation and their interface with 
society.  From this perspective, the judge and judicial decision or judicial decree are not 
the epicenter of litigation, from which all else radiates.  Rather “social struggles 
themselves thus define the center of analysis and nonjudicial actors are viewed as 
practical legal agents rather than as simply reactors to judicial command.”54
The diminished role of the judge in this decentralized, bottom up-model is 
inextricably connected to the lessened concern over winning and losing in court.  If the 
role of the court is reconceptualized from authoritative law givers to that of a forum 
whereby grievances and complaints can be aired and argued, the critical question for the 
litigation is not what the eventual decree or decision states, but how the litigation affects 
the various actors in the policy arena—whether those actors are the public in general, 
54Michael McCann, Reform Litigation on Trial, 18 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 715, 731 
(1993).
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interest groups, legislative bodies, a group the litigants are seeking to organize, or the 
defendants whom the plaintiffs are seeking to force to the bargaining table.  As one 
commentator has argued, the question for many areas of litigation is “not how do judges 
make policy, but rather how courts function as an arena of policy disputation.”55
Even when plaintiffs win in court, it is a mistake to view the judge as the central 
actor in the implementation of relief.  Rather, one must recognize the interdependence of 
the courts, media, activists and other branches of government to achieve meaningful 
reform.56
Legal scholars focus primarily on analyzing judicial decisions:  critiquing, 
rationalizing, legitimating, deconstructing them.  Yet by focusing so extensively and 
centrally on judicial decisions and the role of the judge, legal scholars risk missing the 
larger picture.  That broader view is that judicial decisions represent only one incident in 
what is a rich, variegated and lengthy process of resolving a grievance or public dispute.  
By focusing narrowly on the decision instead of the entire process, legal scholars fail to 
understand the broader landscape.
Often real cases will present elements of both the forum for protest and 
institutional reform model, for as with any model, reality is always more complex and 
intricate than any theoretical or doctrinal formulation.  Thus in many cases, litigants who 
seek to utilize courts to educate the public and mobilize their social and political 
movements will also be demanding strong judicial intervention to which they should be 
55Margo Schlanger, The Courts:  Beyond the Hero Judge:  Institutional Reform 
Litigation as Litigation, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1994, 1996 (1999).
56Susan P. Strum, The Legacy and Future of Corrections Litigation, 142 U. PA. L. 
REV. 639, 655 (1993).
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entitled to remedy an aggregious constitutional violation.  Moreover, while certain cases 
may present the forum for protest model in its pure form, much public interest litigation 
has as a purpose furthering public education and discourse and in many cases the 
courtroom battle is but one aspect of a broader political struggle.  That many public law 
litigants have interests in the litigation that extend beyond winning or losing in the 
courtroom has important implications for lawyers’ strategies and tactics in litigating those 
cases and for judical responses to the litigation as part of a multi-faceted political 
struggle.
B. The Legitimacy of This Model
The model proposed here, however efficacious and widespread in public law 
litigation raises the question whether these kind of cases and legal strategies are 
legitimate uses of the courtroom and litigation.  Several types of problems appear 
immediately.  The first is whether a litigation strategy that seeks favorable publicity to 
further a social movement is an ethical and legitimate use of courts.  Second, and related, 
are such purposes an improper purpose under Rule 11.
For the past century lawyers and judges have debated the proper role of the 
lawyer in obtaining favorable media publicity.  For example, in 1964, a committee of the 
American Bar Association concluded that the proper role of the lawyer “is to present his 
case in the courtroom . . . not attempting to build a favorable climate of public opinion.”57
Various courts have also opined at times that obtaining publicity is not a legitimate 
function of litigation.  For example, the Fourth Circuit recently denied attorney fees for 
public relations work by attorneys in concluding a successful civil rights action, stating 
57AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARD RELATING TO FAIR TRIAL AND FREE 
PRESS 92 (1966).
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that “the legitimate goals of litigation are almost always attained in the courtroom not in 
the media.”58
The same unease over the use of publicity in connection with litigation has also 
affected some law reform organizations.  Felix Frankfurter, then a member of the 
ACLU’s Executive Committee, criticized ACLU Executive Director Roger Baldwin’s 
distribution of a circular criticizing the government’s impending prosecution of a 
communist labor leader.  Frankfurter objected to this attempt to influence public 
sentiment, arguing that the case must be tried in the courts, not in the press or in a 
publicity campaign.  The ACLU Executive Committee eventually adopted Frankfurter’s 
position, “both from a standpoint of effective tactics and general principle.”59
Federal courts have also at times imposed Rule 11 sanctions on attorneys who 
have used the courtroom as a forum for public protest.  The D.C. Circuit’s imposition of 
sanctions against former Attorney General Ramsey Clark for what it termed his attempt 
to use the federal court as a forum for protest in bringing claims on behalf of Libyans 
killed or injured during the 1986 bombing is but one example.60  Another is the sanctions 
imposed by the Fourth Circuit against the prominent civil rights attorney William 
Kunstler and other attorneys.  The Circuit affirmed a district court imposition of Rule 11 
sanctions because Kunstler had filed a civil rights lawsuit with a primary purpose of 
58Rum Creek Coal Sales v. Caperton, 31 F.3d 169, 176 (4th Cir. 1994).  Even 
courts that have allowed attorney fees for public relations work have articulated a narrow 
standard that only permits attorney fees for media work that contributes “directly 
substantially, to the attainment [of the client’s] litigation goals.”  Davis v. City of San 
Francisco, 976 F.2d 1536, 1545 (9th Cir. 1992).
59David M. Rabban, The Free Speech League, the ACLU and Changing 
Conceptions of Free Speech in American History, 45 STAN. L. REV. 47, 102-03 (1992).
60Saltany v. Reagan, 886 F.2d 438 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
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seeking publicity and embarrassing the defendant.61  The Court found that sanctions are 
appropriate even where a complaint is filed to vindicate rights in court, as long as the 
litigant’s central purpose in bringing the lawsuit is “improper,” such as seeking 
publicity.62
Commentators have criticized Saltany and Kunstler,63 other courts have disagreed 
that political education is an improper purpose,64 and Rule 11 was amended in 1993 to 
make it more difficult to impose sanctions on litigants and their attorneys.  Nonetheless, 
the present Rule 11 still bars pleadings filed for “any improper purpose.”  That text 
suggests that a court could sanction a complaint filed for the purpose of seeking publicity, 
even if the primary purpose of the litigation were to vindicate rights.65  These Rule 11 
cases, the text of the rule, and the controversy over the ethical propriety of lawyers 
61In re Kunstler, 914 F.2d 505 (1990).
62Id. at 520.  Subsequently, in Ballentine v. Taco Bell Corp., 135 F.R.D. 117 
(E.D.N.C. 1991), a district court imposed sanctions against a plaintiff in a sex 
discrimination case for filing a claim to harass the defendant, despite concluding that the 
discrimination claim was arguably colorable and filed with the legitimate motive of 
seeking to remedy the alleged discrimination.  The court, using the Kunstler test found 
that plaintiff’s legitimate motive was not central.  Id. at 125.  More recently the Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals has imposed sanctions against an attorney who filed what the 
Circuit assumed was a nonfrivolous claim solely because his purpose was improper.  
Whitehead v. K-Mart Corp., 332 F.3d 796 (5th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
63D’Amato, supra note 10, Tobias, supra note 10.
64Auen v. Sweeny, 109 F.R.D. 678, 680 (N.D.N.Y. 1986); Sussman v. Bank of 
Israel, 56 F.3d 450 (2d Cir. 1993); Zalvidar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823 (9th 
Cir. 1986).
65Andrews, supra note 19, at 23.  Indeed, the Advisory Committee that wrote the 
1983 Amendments to Rule 11 considered, but ultimately rejected inserting the word 
“primarily” into the Rule to qualify the improper purpose clause.  See Letter from Walter 
R. Mansfield, Chairman, Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, to Judge Edward T. 
Gignoux, Chairman of the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure 
(Mar. 9, 1987), reprinted in 97 F.R.D. 190, 191 (1983).
-22-
obtaining favorable media publicity for their clients, illustrate the deep seated doubts in 
some sections of the legal community about the propriety and legitimacy of the role for 
the courts being proposed in this article.
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Legitimacy is fundamentally a function of several interrelated inquiries.  The first 
is historical:  whether within our historical tradition federal courts have played a role as 
forums for protest?  The second is theoretical and doctrinal:  does such a function of 
courts and litigation fit comfortably within our constitutional structure?
II. The History of Litigation as a Forum for Protest in America
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Unlike structural reform litigation, which is a relatively new mid 20th century 
phenomena, the tradition of using litigation as a forum for protest to obtain favorable 
publicity for a political cause dates back even before the American revolution.  James 
Otis spoke publicly about the British abuses involving the writs of assistance, and his 
arguments in the case challenging those writs were widely publicized, including his 
famous speech, of which John Adams later wrote, “Then and there was the child 
independence born.”66  When Adams represented John Hancock and others in the tax 
protests in Boston, he and his colleagues at the bar worked closely with the press to 
publicize the abuses of the British and make the issue public.  Adams’ contentions and 
later a text of his argument were thoroughly aired in the press, along with commentaries 
on the important legal issues.67  Indeed, the evidence strongly supports the conclusion 
that Adams intended his argument in that case to “serve a purpose beyond mere advocacy 
in court.”68  Both the content and use of the draft argument suggests that it was as much a 
political as legal document.69  These revolutionary lawyers were using their cases not 
merely to defend their clients, but to help build a political movement for American 
independence.
66See J. Quincy, Report of Cases Argued and Adjudged in the Supreme Courts of 
Judicature of the Province of Massachusetts Bay 51-57, 469-482 (1865); 2 LEGAL 
PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 107 n.2 (L. Wroth & H. Zobel eds., 1965).
672 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 66, at 173-210; Brief of the 
Petitioner in Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, p. 17; and Panel Discussion:  What to Do 
When Your Case is Front Page News, 14 REV. LITIG. 595, 608 (1995) (comments of 
Michael Tigar).
682 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 66, at 192 (editorial note) 
(Adams’ argument was probably never delivered).  Id.
69Id. at 193.
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The revolutionary tradition pre-independence of using the Courts as a forum for 
protest was continued by the abolitionist movement in the early 19th century.  Historian 
Hendrik Hartog has noted that the “contest over slavery did more than any other cause to 
stimulate the development of an alternate rights conscious, interpretation of the federal 
Constitution.”70  Much of the fugitive slave litigation was geared not merely to winning 
in court, but to galvanizing northern public opinion against slavery.  The lawyer who best 
used litigation to further a political agenda and spark public debate over slavery was 
Salmon Chase.  Chase engaged in such political litigation on behalf of fugitive slaves and 
their underground railroad supporters for more than a decade, eventually using it as a 
springboard to become a U.S. Senator, Secretary of the Treasury under Lincoln and 
ultimately Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court.
Chase’s life was driven by the tension between ambition and moral principles.71
The Republican Party orator Carl Schurz noted in 1860 that he had never met a man more 
“possessed by the desire to be President.”72  Abraham Lincoln reportedly remarked in 
1864 that “Chase is about one and a half times bigger than any other man I ever knew,” 
probably a reference to both Chase’s ability and ego.73
70Hendrik Hartog, The Constitution of Aspiration and “The Rights That Belong to 
Us All, 74 J. AM. HIST. 1013, 1017 (1987).
71By 1837, Chase had established himself as a diligent, effective lawyer, albeit not 
a great one, representing business clients including the Cincinnati branch Bank of the 
United States.  ALBERT BUSHNELL HART, SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 23 (1899).
72FREDERICK J. BLUE, SALMON P. CHASE:  A LIFE IN POLITICS x (1987).
73HART, supra note 71, at 435; G. Edward White, Reconstructing the 
Constitutional Jurisprudence of Salmon P. Chase, 21 N. KY. L. REV. 41, 43-45 (1993).
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But Chase also held strongly felt moral principles that he acted upon, principles 
that probably more than anything else denied him his ultimate ambition of becoming 
President.  A deeply religious man, Chase’s religious faith was the compelling motivation 
behind Chase’s condemnation of and agitation against slavery.
In the mid 1830s both Chase and the abolitionist movement were at turning 
points.  Until then, abolitionism had been mainly a moral and religious crusade that 
sought to abolish slavery by means of moral persuasion, not legal or political action.  
Anti-slavery societies often resolved to use “no weapon but reason and truth” in their 
campaign against slavery.74  Antislavery litigation was utilized mainly as a “practical 
necessity” to defend abolitionists against mobs and riots, not as an ideological 
opportunity.75  But reason and truth had not worked.  Southerners had not been moved by 
moral persuasion to end slavery, and by the 1830s, political abolitionists like James 
Birney were developing constitutional theories that would provide legal and political 
means for challenging slavery.
On March 10, 1837, a troubled James G. Birney appeared at Salmon Chase’s 
office in Cincinnati.  Birney, a former Alabama slave owner turned an abolitionist told 
Chase a heart-wrenching tale that exposed the inhumanity and hypocrisy of slavery.  His 
maid, 20-year-old Matilda Lawrence, had accompanied her master and father Larkin 
Lawrence to Cincinnati.  When her father refused, her plea for freedom she ran away.  
Her father briefly looked for her, then hired the notorious slave catcher John M. Riley to 
find Matilda and return her to slavery.
74JACOBUS TENBROEK, EQUAL UNDER THE LAW 33 (1964).
75ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED:  ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL 
PROCESS 160 (1975).
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Riley located Matilda in March 1837 and she was arrested pursuant to the federal 
Fugitive Slave Act of 1793.  Birney asked 29-year-old Chase to handle Matilda’s case.76
Chase agreed.
Chase’s decision would begin a long crusade earning him the nickname “Attorney 
General for Runaway Slaves,”77 and, though it resulted in mostly losing cases and very 
few freed slaves, it would catapult both Chase and the slavery issue to national 
prominence.  In time, Chase would become the anti-slavery leader most responsible for 
the successful transition from moral outrage to political action.  As the New York 
Tribune later would write, “To Mr. Chase more than any other one man belongs the 
credit of making the anti-slavery feeling, what it had never been before, a power in 
politics.  It had been the sentiment of philanthropists, he made it the inspiration of a great 
political party.”78  A significant part of that effort was Chase’s use of the courts as a 
forum for presenting his anti-slavery views.
Chase’s main strategy in his argument before Ohio Common Pleas Judge David 
E. Estes seems to have been to use Matilda’s case to challenge the constitutionality of the 
Fugitive Slave Act of 1793.  While he did raise a number of technical, legal arguments, 
he discussed those quickly.  Chase focused instead on broader constitutional points of 
natural rights, federalism, and the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.  He did so over the 
objection of opposing counsel and clear signals from the judge that Chase’s discourse 
76STEPHEN MIDDLETON, OHIO AND THE ANTISLAVERY ACTIVITIES OF ATTORNEY 
SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 1830-1849, at 96 (1990); JOHN NIVEN, SALMON P. CHASE: A 
BIOGRAPHY 50 (1995).
77NIVEN, supra note 76, at 78.
78ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN:  THE IDEOLOGY OF THE 
REPUBLICAN PARTY BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR 74 (1995).
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was not pertinent.  His opening and closing arguments were attempts to infuse the 
Constitution with broad natural rights and an egalitarian moral perspective.  He 
“perceived” the court’s responsibility as not merely to the individual and community, 
“but to conscience and to God.”79
Judge Estes listened patiently to Chase, but quickly ruled against him based on the 
current state of the law.  Slave catcher Riley quickly rushed Matilda across the Ohio 
River to Covington, Kentucky and eventually to New Orleans where Lawrence had 
arranged for her sale.
The historian William Wiecik has termed Chase’s Matilda argument “a noble 
failure.”80  Chase was saddened by the outcome of the case and felt that his legal position 
had been “treated with ridicule or disregard.”81  Yet, despite Matilda’s personal tragedy, 
Chase’s mentor Birney believed that the case had “done much for the cause in this 
city.”82  The litigation had stirred considerable debate over fugitive slaves and slavery in 
Cincinnati.  It was clear that Chase’s argument was designed not merely to win before 
Judge Estes, but to help spur a political movement against slavery.  Birney and Chase in 
the Matilda case had worked out the legal theory that, while losing in court, was 
eventually to become the constitutional platform of the Republican Party.
79Speech of Salmon Portland Chase in the Case of the Colored Woman Matilda, 
7-8, Mar. 11, 1837 (1837).
80WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE SOURCES OF ANTISLAVERY CONSTITUTIONALISM IN 
AMERICA, 1760-1848, at 193 (1977).
81FONER, supra note 78, at 74.
82MIDDLETON, supra note 76, at 102.
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The Matilda case did not vanish with the unfortunate woman’s return to slavery.  
Birney was prosecuted for harboring a fugitive slave, and was found guilty and fined.  
Birney decided not to pay the fine and Chase filed an appeal.  Chase quickly realized that 
Judge Este had made a technical error when he charged the jury to consider only whether 
Birney had harbored Matilda and not whether he did so knowing that she was a slave.  
But both he and Birney agreed not to raise that issue on appeal, even though they knew 
they would win if they did.  Their interest lay in arguing the broad constitutional issue of
whether Matilda became free the moment she entered Ohio with her master, not in 
“winning” the case and avoiding the fine.
The Ohio Supreme Court’s decision disappointed Chase.  The Court reversed 
Birney’s conviction, but only on the technical grounds not argued by Chase that the jury 
had not considered whether Birney had known Matilda was a slave.  Nonetheless, the 
Ohio Supreme Court took the unusual step of ordering the publication of his arguments in 
the case.  In all likelihood the Court agreed with Chase’s arguments, but was unwilling to 
adopt them in the Ohio political climate of the late 1830s.  So it signaled its leanings by 
having the argument printed and widely publicized.83
For the next decade, Chase actively represented fugitive slaves in Ohio courts.  
His cases usually drew large crowds to the courtroom.  Most of his efforts lost, although 
occasionally he was able to win his client’s freedom.  Most important to Chase, his 
arguments were reaching a wider national audience, touching a chord with northerners 
who wanted to dissociate free states from slavery.
83HART, supra note 71, at 74; J.W. SHUCKERS, THE LIFE AND PUBLIC SERVICES OF 
SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 43-44 (1970); Chase’s argument is printed in James G. 
Birney v. The State of Ohio, 8 OHIO REPORTS 230, 231 (1837).
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Chase’s most famous case stemmed from his representation of an abolitionist 
involved in the underground railroad.  His representation of John Van Zandt, particularly 
his appeal to the Supreme Court, might be termed frivolous or baseless in modern 
parlance.  Yet, this case may have done more than any other of Chase’s cases to publicize 
the theories and positions that were to motivate Northern public opinion to support a 
political movement that eventually became the Republican Party.
On April 21, 1842, John Van Zandt, an old, stooped farmer who had left 
Kentucky because of his hatred of slavery, was conducting nine fugitive slaves north 
when his wagon was stopped by two slave catchers.  The slave driving the wagon fled, 
but the other eight were captured and rushed across the Ohio River to Covington, 
Kentucky where their owner, Wharton Jones, reclaimed them and paid the slave catchers 
$450.
Jones then sued Van Zandt for harboring fugitives in violation of the fugitive 
slave act.  Chase agreed to take Van Zandt’s case and—as usual in his anti-slavery 
litigation—accepted no fee.  He asked former U.S. Senator Thomas Morris to aid him in 
the defense.
Chase was optimistic about the Van Zandt case.  He recognized that whatever the 
outcome in Court, the case would get wide publicity for his anti-slavery constitutional 
views.  Moreover, he thought he could win in court despite the substantial evidence that 
Van Zandt was transporting slaves he knew to be fugitives.
Chase did have some good reasons to be optimistic about the Van Zandt case.  
The case would be tried in federal court before Supreme Court Justice John McLean who 
was assigned to the Ohio District.  McLean, an impressive looking man whose features 
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and reserved demeanor resembled those of George Washington, had strong anti-slavery 
views.  McLean had ruled in favor of fugitive slaves when he was an Ohio Supreme 
Court Justice and in 1842 had set forth his anti-slavery views in the U.S. Supreme Court 
case of Prigg v. Pennsylvania.  Moreover, McLean was Chase’s friend and soon to be 
uncle-in-law.  It would be hard to find a better federal judge to try the Van Zandt case.
Justice McLean rejected Chase’s motion to dismiss the case, and a jury ultimately 
awarded Jones $1,200 damages.  McLean believed that the duty to obey the law overrode 
natural rights, his anti-slavery views, and individual conscience.  He charged the jury:
In the course of this discussion much has been said of the laws of 
nature, of conscience, and the rights of conscience.  This monitor, under 
great excitement, may mislead, and always does mislead, when it urges 
anyone to violate the law.84
Chase moved for a new trial, continuing his by then increasingly futile 
constitutional challenge to the fugitive slave law.  McLean again decided against Chase.  
While he agreed with Chase’s view of slavery and the presumption in Ohio that every 
person was free, McLean’s view of the Constitution’s necessary compromise with slavery 
made him object to Chase’s natural law argument and his appeal to conscience.  To 
McLean, the immorality of slavery was irrelevant.  Repeating his charge to the jury:  
“The law is our only guide.”85
Chase however remained undaunted and appealed to the United States Supreme
Court.  His unbounded faith, combined with tremendous drive and ambition motivated 
84Jones v. Van Zandt, 13 Fed. Cas. 1040, 1045 (Cir. Ct. Ohio 1843).
85Id. at 1047.
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him to articulate arguments that eventually moved thousands of northerners to view the 
fugitive slave law as unconstitutional.  But that faith did not move the Supreme Court.  
After the Court unanimously ruled against Van Zandt, Chase wrote to the prominent NY 
abolitionist Lewis Tappan that “I regret the decision in the Van Zandt case, and, I 
confess, did not expect it.”86  If he did not, pretty much everyone else did.
But even Chase must have recognized that the chance of winning Van Zandt’s 
appeal in the Supreme Court was minuscule.  The Court’s 1842 Prigg v. Pennsylvania
decision rendered a constitutional attack on the Fugitive Slave Act futile.87  The only 
Supreme Court Justice with anti-slavery views was Justice McLean, and he had already 
ruled against Chase.  Although McLean had urged the Court to hear oral argument in the 
Van Zandt case, Chief Justice Taney objected to hearing oral argument for he thought the 
constitutional question was already settled.  Taney persuaded the rest of the Court except 
McLean, and Chase was relegated to submitting only a written brief, an ominous sign.  
Perhaps Chase subconsciously recognized that he could not win, for his Van Zandt brief 
comes the closest he ever was to come to adopting a pure higher natural law theory.  His 
brief straddled the fine line between “urging the disregard of positive law and the 
incorporation of natural law within it.”88  Chase’s argument was designed to test the limit 
of law, to put before the country and the court the conflict between humanity and 
prevailing law.
86SHUCKERS, supra note 83, at 65.
87Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539 (1842).
88COVER, supra note 75, at 173.
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The brief opened by tacitly admitting that current legal precedent might be against 
him.  Chase argued however, that “such authority may stand for law,” but does not 
always represent the law.  Reason and truth “will ultimately prevail.”89  Other well-
established legal doctrines have been overturned in time, and Chase urged the Court to 
consider his arguments dispassionately and openly.  Fifty pages of technical legal 
argument followed to prove that Van Zandt could not be liable unless the slave owner 
actually notified him that the persons he was transporting were fugitive slaves.  Chase’s 
argument was logical, well-researched and persuasively argued:  but his interpretation of 
the law would have made it virtually impossible to prosecute underground railroaders:  a 
result neither the South nor the Supreme Court was willing to countenance.
If the first part of Chase’s argument was technically sound but clearly judicially 
unattainable, the second half descended to utter futility.  His argument that the Fugitive 
Slave Act was unconstitutional defied legal precedent and current political reality.  Yet 
the brief brilliantly sets forth Chase’s anti-slavery constitutional philosophy.  Future 
Massachusetts Senator Charles Sumner considered Chase’s Van Zandt brief to be the best 
he had ever read and borrowed Chase’s arguments when he condemned the fugitive slave 
law in the Senate a few years later.  “It is a triumph of freedom,” said retired Justice Story 
of Chase’s argument, and accurately predicted that “his points will seriously influence the 
public mind and perhaps the politics of the country.”90
89S.P. CHASE, AN ARGUMENT FOR THE DEFENDANT SUBMITTED TO THE SUPREME 
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES AT THE DECEMBER TERM 1846 IN THE CASE OF WARTON 
JONES V. JOHN VAN ZANDT 5 (1847).
90HART, supra note 71, at 77.
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That was Chase’s aim.  A biographer argues that Chase’s point “was simply to put 
before the country a solemn protest against making the free States share in slavery.”91
Chase reprinted the brief as a pamphlet that he widely distributed to every member of 
Congress, and other leading politicians irrespective of their views on slavery.  The case 
attracted national attention:  Chase used the forum to publicize the anti-slavery cause and 
help his own political ambitions.  He had astutely secured the prominent Governor of 
New York, William Henry Seward, to act as co-counsel in the Supreme Court, in order to 
help the case achieve national prominence.  Seward’s argument to the Court was also 
published, in the New York Tribune.
Chase’s argument, which eventually became the constitutional bedrock of the 
Republican Party, was that the Constitution intended the U.S. government “to be kept 
free of all connection” with slavery, and to exclude slavery from the territories.92  Slavery 
was a local institution, confined to the slave holding states.
Chase drew on several key principles to support his constitutional position:  
principles that were to undergird civil rights litigation throughout the 19th century.  First, 
he drew on the Declaration of Independence and other extra-constitutional sources such 
as the Northwest Ordinance to inform his view of the Constitution.  To anti-slavery 
advocates like Chase, the Declaration’s self-evident truths were not “empty flourishes of 
rhetoric,”93 but proof that slavery was not constitutionally “to be fostered or sustained by 
91Id.
92CHASE, supra note 89, at 82.
93Id. at 76.
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national authority.”94 To Chase either the “Declaration of Independence is a fable,” or 
the Constitution must recognize all inhabitants of the U.S. as persons with rights.95
Chase also relied on a rule of interpretation that the Constitution must be interpreted 
consistently with natural, God-given rights and slavery was a violation of a natural right.  
Reaching its highest rhetorical note, Chase’s brief argued that
No legislature can make right wrong; or wrong, right.  No legislature can 
make light, darkness; or darkness, light.  No legislature can make men, 
things; or things, men.  Nor is any legislature at liberty to disregard the 
fundamental principles of rectitude and justice whether restrained or not 
by constitutional provisions, these are acts beyond any legitimate or 
binding legislative authority . . .96
The Court is obligated therefore to avoid interpreting the U.S. Constitution 
in a manner which will bring its provisions into conflict with that other 
CONSTITUTION, which, rising, in sublime majesty, over all human 
enactments . . . finds its “seat in the bosom of God.”97
Chase’s real plea in Van Zandt, as in many of his other cases, was not to the Court 
but to the public and history.  For Chase, the final arbiter in cases of a “moral and 
political nature” is not the court’s judgment, but “public opinion, not of the American 
people only, but of the Civilized World.”98
Anti-slavery lawyers like Chase, and their southern counterparts, understood that 
an appeal to the Constitution had the same kind of force on public opinion as the equally 
94Id. at 77.
95Id. at 82-83.
96Id. at 93.
97Id. at 107.
98Id.
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common appeal to the Bible, and therefore tried to read into the Constitution self-evident, 
natural rights.  As the son of one of Chase’s friends later recounted, the appeal to 
fundamental rights, “however little it might convince a court, was the most effective of 
all the anti-slavery arguments, because it brought back the discussion to the absolute 
incongruity of democracy and slavery, and emphasized both the question of moral right 
and the social expediency of upholding the moral law.”99
Nobody was surprised—except possibly Chase—when the Supreme Court 
unanimously ruled against Van Zandt, holding the Fugitive Slave Act constitutional 
despite “its supposed inexpediency and [the] invalidity of all laws recognizing slavery or 
any right of property in man.”100  But despite losing, Chase wrote that he was “thankful” 
to have brought the case.101  His arguments were widely publicized and he was 
“satisfied” with the public discussion the case generated.  Abolitionists praised his 
arguments, and the respect he won in Van Zandt and other fugitive slave cases helped 
propel Chase to election to the U.S. Senate in 1849 and Governor of Ohio in 1855 and 
1857.  Lincoln appointed him Secretary of Treasury in 1861, and when Chase could not 
99HART, supra note 71, at 72.  Chase was one of the most effective anti-slavery 
constitutional advocates.  He grounded his constitutional theory both in moral principle 
and practical politics.  One of his biographers notes that, “hundreds of men on both sides 
liked to make the Constitution a partner in their speeches; hardly any other rendered such 
services as Chase in defending victims of slavery who got across the line into the free 
States.  It was his courage as counsel in those cases, his use of all possible legal 
technicalities and expedients in behalf of his client, and his fearless and widely circulated 
speeches, which have made him best known as an anti-slavery man.”  Id. at 73.
100Jones v. Van Zandt, 46 U.S. 215, 231 (5 How. 1847).
101Disappointed with the result, Chase recognized that the deck had been stacked 
against him.  In a letter to future Senator Charles Sumner of Massachusetts, he stated, “I 
do not suppose that the judges of the Supreme Court regarded the arguments as worth 
much attention.  I have reason to believe that the case was decided before they received 
it.  MIDDLETON, supra note 76, at 121.
-37-
contain his presidential ambition, and quietly tried to run against Lincoln in 1864, 
Lincoln recognized his dedication and legal skills honed in his fugitive slave litigation, 
nominated him to be the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court in 1864.
While Chase went on to a national career, the poor, old abolitionist farmer John 
Van Zandt, who had found “special gratification in aiding fugitives from the oppression 
of slavery,”102 died in 1845, while his case was pending in the Supreme Court.  But Van 
Zandt’s struggle lived on in the hearts and minds of others.  Chase considered the 
underground railroader John Van Troupe in Harriet Beecher Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s Cabin
to be modeled on Van Zandt, and hoped that “even though my poor old client be 
sacrificed, the great cause of humanity will be a gainer by it.”103
The main long-term legacy of Chase and other fugitive slave litigators was their 
contribution to a culture that encourages political movements to use courts as vehicles of 
political protest.  That litigation aided the rising tide of Northern public opinion against 
slavery and eventually contributed to a Republican Party nominee who won the 
presidency helped by his attacks on the Supreme Court.  As the prominent Wisconsin 
newspaper editor Rufus King wrote in 1855, the judicial controversy over the 
constitutionality of the Fugitive Slave Act “must provoke, everywhere, discussion and 
agitation, and Liberty and Right must profit by these.”104
Nor was Chase the only anti-slavery advocate who used the courtroom for 
political ends prior to the Civil War.  Another group of abolitionists waged a more 
102Id. at 127.
103BLUE, supra note 72, at 38.
104FONER, supra note 78, at 136.
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utopian battle to constitutionally extinguish slavery everywhere in the United States.  
These abolitionists also read the Constitution to conform to the Declaration of 
Independence and the natural right to freedom but drew the much more radical 
conclusion that the Constitution required the abolition of slavery both in the North and in 
the South.  They did so in the belief that Northern reverence for the Constitution required 
the abolitionist movement to develop an anti-slavery constitutional interpretation in order 
to gain adherents and spur anti-slavery sentiment.  Like Chase and the more moderate 
anti-slavery movement, the utopian constitutionalists used test-case litigation as one 
means of publicizing their constitutional doctrines.
In 1844, the utopian constitutionalists created an opportunity to litigate their broad 
constitutional theories in court.  That year, New Jersey ratified a new constitution that 
included a Declaration of Rights providing that “All men are by nature free and 
independent, and have certain natural and unalienable rights.”105  Although the framers of 
the New Jersey constitution had ignored the continued, although dying existence of 
slavery in that state, the New Jersey Anti-Slavery Society nevertheless resolved to initiate 
a test case to “settle the question of the existence of slavery under the new 
Constitution.”106  They genuinely hoped to win in court, but the abolitionists’ primary 
goal was to focus the attention of an indifferent public on their cause.107
The New Jersey abolitionists realized that their constitutional challenge to the 
remnants of slavery in New Jersey would be difficult, and their leader, John Grimes, was 
105N.J. CONST. art. I, § 1.
106Daniel R. Ernst, Legal Positivism, Abolitionist Litigation, and the New Jersey 
Slave Case of 1845, 4 LAW & HISTORY REV. 337, 343 (1986).
107Id. at 337-38.
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openly dubious.108  Alvan Stewart who argued the case for the abolitionists, eschewed 
legal formalism in favor of a broad political-moral argument.  While he purported to be 
arguing a dry legal question,109 his argument reads like a political speech or religious 
sermon.  In his request for relief, he asked that the “court set the nation the shining 
example of doing right on this question, by acting up to the full measure of their judicial 
and moral power.”110
The New Jersey Supreme Court, by a 3-1 vote, rejected Stewart’s plea.  The 
justices chose to follow the formalistic reasoning of the defense counsel, Joseph Bradley, 
who was later appointed to the United States Supreme Court.111  According to one 
member of New Jersey’s highest court, Stewart’s arguments were “rather addressed to 
the feelings than to the legal intelligence of the court.”112  Only the antislavery Justice 
Joseph Hornblower dissented, and he did so without writing an opinion.113
108Id. at 343.
109Id.
110Id. at 470.
111Justice Bradley’s most famous civil rights decision was his opinion in The Civil 
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), in which he articulated a formalistic reading of the
Fourteenth Amendment to deny Congress the power to prohibit segregation in public 
inns, accommodations, and transportation.
112State v. Post, 20 N.J.L. 368, 369 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1845).
113The abolitionists appealed to the New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals, 
which affirmed the decision of the Supreme Court by a 7-1 vote without issuing written 
opinions.  State v. Post, 21 N.J.L. 699 (N.J. 1848).
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While losing in Court, the New Jersey Slave Cases did accomplish the 
abolitionists’ aim of initiating a political debate on slavery, which ended in the New 
Jersey legislature’s formal abolition of slavery in that state several years later.114
Similarly, in Boston black and white abolitionists waged a concerted campaign in 
the 1840s to end segregation, which included litigation as one component of the broader 
political effort.  The litigation lost in court, but helped place the issue of segregation on 
the legislative agenda.  In 1841, a number of black abolitionists, including Frederick 
Douglass, attempted to ride the “white” cars of various segregated Massachusetts 
railroads.115  When physically removed, they often sued; yet the lower courts ruled in 
favor of the railroads.  The abolitionists turned to the legislature, and the resulting 
pressure forced the railroads to voluntarily end segregated cars.116  The Boston 
abolitionist community then challenged school segregation.  In the 1849 case Roberts v. 
Boston, the Massachusetts Supreme Court, in an unanimous opinion written by the 
prominent antislavery judge Lemuel Shaw, upheld segregated schools in 
114In Massachusetts, Charles Sumner litigated and lost the Boston school 
desegregation case, Roberts v. City of Boston, 59 Mass. (1 Cush.) 198 (1849).  In both 
New Jersey and Massachusetts, abolitionists eventually obtained politically through 
legislative action what they failed to win in the courts.  HAROLD H. HYMAN & WILLIAM 
M. WIECEK, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW: CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 1883-1875, 
at 90, 96, 97 (1982) (racial segregation was prohibited in Boston by statute in 1855); 
Ernst, supra note 106, at 364 n.109 (Abolitionsts won a partial victory in 1846 when the 
New Jersey legislature formally abolished slavery but declared the slaves to be 
apprentices for life.).
115LEON F. LITWACK, NORTH OF SLAVERY, THE NEGRO IN THE FREE STATES, 
1790-1860, at 107-08 (1961); J. Morgan Kousser, The Supremacy of Equal Rights’:  The 
Struggle Against Racial Discrimination in Antebellum Massachusetts and the 
Foundations of the Fourteenth Amendments, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 941, 954 (1988).
116Kousser, supra note 115, at 955.
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Massachusetts.117  Yet, despite their loss in the courts, the abolitionist community 
continued its political struggle, and, five years later, the Massachusetts legislature barred 
segregation.  Similarly, New York City blacks in the 1850s formed the Legal Rights 
Association and, represented by future President Chester A. Arthur and other lawyers, 
staged a series of sit-ins against segregated streetcars, losing in court but succeeding in 
pressuring a number of railroads to end segregation.118  In each of these cases the 
litigation was brought, not merely to prevail in court, but as one method to spur debate in 
both the public at large and in the legislature.
After the Civil War, African Americans continued this abolitionist tradition, 
waging an impressive campaign in the courts against racial discrimination in schools.  
Between 1865 and 1903, more than seventy challenges to discriminatory schools were 
litigated throughout the United States.119  Blacks overwhelmingly lost the cases that were 
decided on Fourteenth Amendment grounds, although they were often successful on 
narrower state law claims.120  Moreover, even lawsuits that lost in court often led to 
legislative victories.  For example, New York blacks lost all six cases that they brought 
117Roberts v. Boston, 59 Mass. 198 (1849); JIM CROW IN BOSTON:  THE ORIGIN OF 
THE SEPARATE BUT EQUAL DOCTRINE xi (Leonard W. Levy & Douglas L. Jones eds., 
1974).
118Donald G. Neiman, The Language of Liberation:  African Americans and 
Egalitarian Constitutionalism, 1830-1950, in THE CONSTITUTION, LAW AND AMERICAN 
LIFE:  CRITICAL ASPECTS OF THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY EXPERIENCE 67, 71 (Donald G. 
Nieman ed., 1992).
119See J. MORGAN KOUSSER, DEAD END:  THE DEVELOPMENT OF NINETEENTH 
CENTURY LITIGATION ON RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN SCHOOLS 5 (1986).
120Only one judge out of the 33 cases involving the Fourteenth Amendment 
“squarely ruled that school segregation per se contravened the Fourteenth Amendment.”  
Id. at 9.
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challenging school segregation in the 19th century, but the judicial battle was a 
springboard to victory in the local political arena; the state legislature enacted legislation 
securing integration.  As Professor J. Morgan Kousser has written about the New York 
experience:  “the failures of success and the ultimate success that stemmed from those 
failures . . . all would be missed by observers concerned only with the abstract principles 
embodied in printed court opinions.”121
The early women’s movement also used the courts for the purposes of political 
agitation.  At an 1869 women’s suffrage convention, a husband and wife team of 
Missouri suffragists, Francis and Virginia Minor, argued that, instead of agitating for a 
new constitutional provision granting women, feminists should assert that they already 
had the constitutional right to vote under the Fourteenth Amendment’s privileges and 
immunities clause.  They urged women to attempt to vote and, if prevented, to sue the 
officials who had denied them that right.  The Minors viewed litigation as a means not 
only of vindicating rights, but also of educating the public.  Francis Minor urged that a 
test case be brought because, “in no other way could our cause be more widely, and at the 
same time definitely, brought before the public.  Every newspaper in the land would tell 
the story, every fireside would hear the news.  The question would be thoroughly 
discussed by thousands who now give it no thought.”122
Several test cases were brought by what became known as the New Departure 
Movement.  The case that stirred the most political debate and controversy was initiated 
121Id. at 14.
122ELIZABETH CADY STANTON, SUSAN B. ANTHONY & MATILDA JOSLYNE CAGE, 
2 THE HISTORY OF WOMEN SUFFRAGE 408 (1969).
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when Susan B. Anthony convinced the Republican poll inspectors to allow her to vote in 
the 1872 election.
Anthony and her comrades created an immediate sensation around the country, 
earning both cheers and attacks.  The New York Times boldly declared that “the act of 
Susan B. Anthony should have a place in history”; the Toledo Blade praised her for 
“keeping the public mind agitated upon the women’s rights question,” while the 
hometown Rochester Union and Advertiser condemned her for “female lawlessness.”123
But Susan Anthony saw voting as a mere precursor to the main event.  
Encouraged by the response to her dramatic action, she hoped to launch a test case on 
behalf of the registered women who had been turned away from the polls.  For Anthony, 
as for the abolitionists Chase and Stewart, litigation was both a means to win concrete 
rights and an opportunity to convert the courtroom into an arena for protest.  A courtroom 
battle, she believed, would provide a dramatic forum for publicizing the cause.  To her 
friend, the feminist leader Elizabeth Cady Stanton, she wrote about the exhilaration of 
casting a vote in a national election, and her expectation of the ensuing litigation:  “[W]e 
are in for a fine agitation in Rochester on this question.”124
Anthony could not have foreseen the course of events that was to result in one of 
the great state trials of the 19th century.  On Thanksgiving Day, a federal marshal asked 
the women voters of Rochester to turn themselves in to be prosecuted under an 1870 
federal statute, grandly titled “An Act to Enforce the Right of Citizens of the United 
123ALMA LUTZ, 2 SUSAN B. ANTHONY:  REBEL, CRUSADER, HUMANITARIAN 200 
(1959); see also IDA HARPER, 1 THE LIFE AND WORK OF SUSAN B. ANTHONY 424-25 
(1898).
124STANTON, supra note 122, at 934.
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States to Vote.”  Designed to prevent former Confederates from voting illegally and to 
prevent Klan intimidation of black voters, the statute had ensnared as its first victims a 
respectable group of northern housewives who had voted for the Republican ticket.
The women did not surrender.  As Anthony reported, “The ladies refusing to 
respond to this polite invitation, Marshal Keeney made the circuit to collect the rebellious 
forces.”125  Finely tuned to political theater, Anthony even demanded that the courteous 
and embarrassed marshal take her to jail in handcuffs.  Eventually, all the women voters 
and the three election inspectors who had let them vote were indicted.  The stage was 
thus set for a courtroom battle that would be even more dramatic than the test case 
Anthony had originally hoped to bring.126
After her indictment in December 1872, Anthony launched a broad speaking 
campaign to educate the people of Rochester on the right of all citizens to have equal 
access to the ballot.  Over the course of the next several months, Anthony spoke in 
twenty-nine different post-office districts in the county, hoping, she said, “to make a 
125Id. at 628.
126Of course, resort to test-case litigation had its critics, even among supporters of 
women’s suffrage.  The famous abolitionist orator Wendell Phillips agreed with the New 
Departurists’ claim that the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of citizens’ privileges 
and immunities required women suffrage but believed that the legal argument was “too 
good a handle for agitation to be risked by a speedy contest in the courts.”  As Phillips 
prophetically argued, “an adverse decision would destroy its value as a new means of 
attack.”  Woman Suffrage Before the Courts, THE REVOLUTION, June 11, 1871.  The 
Nation opined that the change the New Departurists hoped for was too momentous to 
occur through judicial resolution; women’s suffrage, the paper editorialized, “could not 
be achieved by anything short of deliberate popular consent.”  The Nation, June 26, 1987, 
at 426.  The American Women’s Suffrage Association viewed the litigation effort as 
foolhardy, and even Stanton, while she admired much about the approach, was never 
enthusiastic about a court test.
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verdict of guilty impossible.”127  Her campaign obviously was having an impact, for the 
district attorney moved to change the trial’s venue to another county, and the court 
granted his motion.
The change of venue did not stop Anthony’s agitation.  In the twenty-two days 
before the opening of the trial, Anthony made twenty-one speeches in the new county to 
which the action had been transferred.  Another suffrage leader, Matilda Joslyn Gage, 
spoke in an additional sixteen townships.  Together they covered the entire county, taking 
the offensive and declaring that “the United States [is] on trial, not Susan B. Anthony.”128
Anthony publicized her argument that she had committed no crime but simply exercised 
her citizen’s right to vote, as guaranteed by the Constitution.
Anthony clearly was successful in generating nationwide publicity.  Her use of 
the pending court proceeding as a forum on women’s suffrage set off a lively debate in 
the press.  The Syracuse Standard wrote that “Miss S. B. Anthony . . . is conducting her 
case in a way that beats even lawyers,” while the New York Commercial Advertiser
admired the “regular St. Anthony’s dance she leads the District Attorney . . . in spite of 
winter cold or summer heat, [Anthony] will carry her case from county to county 
precisely as fast as the venue is changed.  One must rise very early in the morning to get 
the start of this active apostle of the sisterhood.”129  Other papers excoriated Anthony’s 
attempt to influence public opinion.  A Rochester Union & Advertiser piece was 
headlined, “Susan B. Anthony as a Corruptionist,” and angrily declared that “United 
127STANTON, supra note 122, at 630.
128Id.
129Id. at 936.
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States Courts are not stages for the enactment of comedy or farce.”130  A reader wrote in 
that Anthony was committing “a law offense known as embracery,” defined as “such 
practices as lead to affect the administration of justice, improperly working upon the 
minds of jurors.”131
Anthony’s trial opened on June 18, 1873, before the newly appointed Supreme 
Court Justice Ward Hunt.132  The packed courtroom included such notables as former 
President Millard Fillmore, Senator Charles Sedgwick, and former Congressman E. G. 
Lapham.
Justice Hunt immediately made it clear that he was determined to limit Anthony’s 
use of the case for political protest.  He refused to permit Anthony to be a witness in her 
own behalf, ruling that she was incompetent, although he did allow the Assistant U.S. 
District Attorney to submit hearsay evidence of Anthony’s testimony at pretrial hearings.
Anthony’s lead attorney was retired New York State Appellate Judge and former 
New York lieutenant governor, Henry Selden.  After Selden’s three-hour argument and 
the district attorney’s rebuttal, Judge Hunt read his prepared opinion.  Written before the 
trial had commenced, it stated that Anthony had no right to vote under the Constitution 
and that any mistaken belief she may have had about such a right did not excuse her 
criminal action.  As a matter of law, he directed the jury to find Anthony guilty and then 
discharged the jury.
130Id.
131Id. at 937.
132Id. at 647.
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The court then fined Anthony $100 and the costs of the prosecution, to which 
Anthony replied that she would not pay a penny and would exhort women that 
“resistance to tyranny is obedience to God.”133 But Anthony was not sent to prison for 
refusing to pay her fine.  In an unusual move for such a case, Hunt said that he would not 
order Anthony imprisoned until the fine was paid.  As Anthony’s lawyer John Van 
Voorhis later commented, it was an adroit move, intended to deny Anthony the ability to 
use a writ of habeas corpus to take her case directly to the Supreme Court of the United 
States, where she would have had an excellent argument that her right to trial by jury had 
been denied.134  Anthony never paid the fine, the government never proceeded to enforce 
the fine or to jail her, the other women voters’ cases were not prosecuted, and Anthony 
lost her chance for Supreme Court review.
Anthony’s case did generate substantial public controversy.  Virtually every 
newspaper in the country reported and commented on the trial, and several reprinted 
Anthony’s arguments about women’s right to vote.135
133KATHERINE ANTHONY, SUSAN B. ANTHONY:  HER PERSONAL HISTORY AND 
HER ERA 299 (1954).
134Godfrey D. Lehman, Susan B. Anthony Cast Her Ballot For Ulysses S. Grant, 
AMERICAN HERITAGE 27 (Dec. 1985).
135The women voters were largely portrayed with sympathy:  one newspaper 
described the “lawbreakers” as “elderly matronly-looking women with thoughtful faces, 
just the sort one would like to see in charge of one’s sickroom, considerate, patient, and 
kindly.”  The Albany Law Journal agreed with the guilty verdict and suggested that 
Anthony “adopt the methods of reform that men use, or better, still, migrate,” but 
criticized Hunts’ decision to remove the case from the jury.  The New York Sun attacked 
Hunt for violating one of the most important provisions of the Constitution, while the 
Utica Observer approved Hunts’ interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment but 
nonetheless condemned his seizure of jury power.  Lehman, supra note 134.
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More than a thousand dollars and scores of letters of support poured in to 
Anthony after Hunt’s verdict.  She used most of the money to publish a pamphlet 
containing a full report on the trial.  Three thousand copies were sent out to libraries and 
newspapers all over the country, and five thousand copies of Selden’s argument were also 
distributed.136  The next year, one newspaper called Anthony “America’s best known 
woman.”137  She had used litigation successfully to protest women’s inequality, speaking 
to thousands of people about the case, engaging prominent figures in her agitation up to 
and including the President of the United States, and initiating debate in legal journals, as 
well as in the popular press of the day.
The New Departurists brought a number of other test cases, all of which lost in 
court.  The decisive loss came when the Supreme Court unanimously ruled, in a case 
brought by the Minors that the Constitution did not guarantee women the right to vote.138
Despite their losses, the New Departurists as one historian has noted, were not primarily 
“outcome-oriented” litigants, but activists who believed that the real success of their 
strategy “must be measured in terms of the amount and kind of publicity it was able to 
generate.”139
Susan B. Anthony’s case is now remembered as a noble, legitimate and useful 
attempt to enlist the courts and country in behalf of women’s right to vote.  Supreme 
136ANTHONY, supra note 133, at 301.
137Sandra Day O’Connor, The History of the Women’s Suffrage Movement, 49 
VAND. L. REV. 657, 662 (1996).
138Minor v. Happersatt, 88 U.S. 162 (1875).
139KAREN O’CONNOR, WOMEN’S ORGANIZATIONAL USE OF THE COURTS 43 
(1980).
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Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, reflecting on the significance of Anthony’s case 
stated:
In another respect, Susan B. Anthony was the clear victor.  Her treatment 
at the hands of the judicial system won for her the sympathy even of those 
who had been opposed to her original act.”140
Anthony was denied a jury trial precisely because she had successfully used her case as a 
forum for public agitation and protest.
Nor was Anthony the only early leader of the women’s movement to use the 
courts in this fashion.  Margaret Sanger, the birth control activist, who in 1914 founded a 
magazine Women Rebel, “dedicated to the interest of working women,”141 provoked an 
indictment with the notion of using the resulting trial to garner publicity for her cause.
Similarly civil liberties organizations in the first part of the twentieth century, 
well before the well publicized law reform movements of the 1950s and 60s, used 
litigation as a means for publicizing their cause.  The Free Speech League clearly saw the 
early 1900s free speech fights and the resulting court cases as a means of publicizing its 
radical first amendment views.142  Even the more conservative ACLU, despite 
Frankfurter’s early objections, used litigation in tandem with other means of publicizing 
its views.  In the 1930s watershed case of Hague v. CIO, establishing the right to use 
public forums to publicize one’s views, one chronicler of the ACLU notes that
140O’Connor, supra note 137, at 662.
141Rabban, supra note 59.
142Id.
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The ACLU did not simply run to the courthouse; it sent speakers like 
Norman Thomas to Jersey City to protest the Hague regime’s 
discrimination against labor organizers.  It consciously sought out 
publicity in the media, including more conservative establishment 
newspapers.  It persuaded influentials like Walter Lippman and Dorothy 
Thompson to speak out.  And it solicited the assistance of organizations 
like the CIO.  While litigation was critical, it was nevertheless only a 
single element in a well-orchestrated campaign of resistance.143
143Robert Radin, Lawyers for Social Change:  Perspectives on Public Interest 
Law, 28 STAN. L. REV. 207, 212 (1976).
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To summarize, these examples illustrate that throughout American history, 
political movements and organizations have resorted to the courts, and the federal courts 
in particular, not simply to win favorable court decisions, but as a mechanism to publicize 
these movements’ views.  Even when this litigation lost in court, as in Chase’s or 
Anthony’s cases, the cases often generated substantial publicity and sympathy for the 
litigants.  Lawyers such as Chase were viewed by respected legal observers such as 
Justice Story and Charles Sumner as being engaged in legitimate litigation and using 
appropriate strategies, and his legal work on behalf of fugitive slaves was one 
qualification that supported his appointment as Chief Justice of the United States 
Supreme Court.
III. First Amendment Protection for Using Courts as Forums for Protest
The use by protest movements of the courts as forums to express and publicize 
their views finds protection under the First Amendment.  On many occasions, the 
Supreme Court has proclaimed that litigation is a “form of political expression” protected 
by the First Amendment.144  In 1972, the Court held that “the right of access to the courts 
is indeed but one aspect of the right of petition.”145  The Court has reiterated that “[f]iling 
a complaint in court is a form of petitioning activity,” protected by the First 
Amendment.146
144NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429 (1963).
145California Transport v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972).
146McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 484 (1983); see also Bill Johnson’s 
Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 745 (1983); SureTan v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 
897 (1984); Professional Real Estate Investors v. Columbia Pictures Industries Inc., 508 
U.S. 49 (1993).
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The Supreme Court has also specifically noted the difference between private 
litigation to resolve disputes and public interest lawsuits which are at the core of the First 
Amendment’s protective ambit and are thus entitled to greater protection.  In NAACP v. 
Button, for example, the Court noted that “[i]n the context of NAACP objectives, 
litigation is not a technique of resolving private differences; it is a means for achieving 
the lawful objectives of equality of treatment by all government, federal, state and local, 
for the members of the Negro community in this country.  It is thus a form of political 
expression . . . resort to the courts to seek vindication of constitutional rights is a different 
matter from the oppressive, malicious or avaricious use of the legal process for purely 
private gain.”147  The Button Court felt that “regulations which reflect hostility to stirring 
up litigation have been aimed chiefly at those who urge recourse to the courts for private 
gain, serving no public interest.”148
Justice Powell, writing for the Court in In re Primus also relied on the distinction 
between public interest litigation and litigation undertaken primarily for pecuniary gain to 
determine the constitutionally permissible scope of a state’s proscription of 
solicitation.149  The Court noted that Primus’
actions were undertaken to express personal political beliefs and to 
advance the civil-liberties objectives of the ACLU, rather than to derive 
financial gain.  The question presented in this case is whether in light of 
the values protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments, these 
147NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429, 443 (1963).
148Id. at 440.
149In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
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differences materially affect the scope of state regulation of the conduct of 
lawyers.150
Justice Powell held that those differences were material.151  He noted that for the ACLU, 
like the NAACP, litigation is a form of political expression and political association.  
Most importantly, Justice Powell argued that “The ACLU engages in litigation as a 
vehicle for effective political expression and association, as well as a means of 
communicating useful information to the public.”152  In Primus, as in Button the Court 
recognized that litigation can be a form of “cooperative, organizational activity,” which is 
part of the “freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas” 
protected by the First Amendment.153
The Court has also relied on the First Amendment to severely limit the 
applicability of federal statutes to sanction litigation that was undertaken in “bad faith.”  
In Professional Real Estate Investors v. Columbia Pictures Inc., the Court invoked the 
150Id. at 422.
151The court on other occasions has noted that the difference between public 
interest litigation and litigation for pecuniary gain is significant in determining the 
constitutionality of bar rules.  Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618 (1995).  The 
American Bar Association has also recognized that the rules for professional conduct 
cannot ignore the differences between public interest and purely private litigation.  In 
deciding that a National Lawyers Committee opposed to New Deal legislation could, 
consistent with the rules of professional ethics, offer counsel without fee or charge to 
anyone financially unable to retain counsel to challenge such legislation, the ABA’s 
Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances held that “the question presented, with 
its implication, involves problems of political, social and economic character that have 
long since assumed the proportions of national issues, one side or the other which 
multitude of patriotic citizens have aligned themselves.  These issues transcend the range 
of professional ethics.”  Opinion 148, Opinion of the Committee on Professional Ethics 
and Grievances, American Bar Association 308, 312 (1957).
152Id. at 431 (emphasis added).
153436 U.S. at 438 n.32.
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First Amendment right of petition to interpret the Sherman Act as immunizing a litigant 
from antitrust liability even where the litigant was motivated solely by an anti-
competitive intent and not by an expectation of a successful outcome to the litigation.  
Such litigation was entitled to immunity unless it was also “objectively baseless in the 
sense that no reasonable litigant could realistically expect success on the merits.”154
Moreover, even if subjectively “bad faith,” anti-competitive litigation presented a “novel” 
claim without any supporting authority, it was nonetheless entitled to antitrust immunity, 
“as long as a similarly situated reasonable litigant could have perceived some likelihood 
of success.”155
Similarly, in Bill Johnson Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB the Court held that First 
Amendment and federalism concerns prevented “a well-founded lawsuit” from being 
“enjoined as an unfair labor practice, even if it would not have been commenced but for 
the plaintiff’s desire to retaliate against the defendant for exercising rights protected by 
the [NLRA].”156  “The right of access to a court is too important to be called an unfair 
labor practice solely on the ground that what is sought in court is to enjoin employees 
from exercising a protected right.”157  The Court recognized in Johnson, as in Primus, 
that it is legitimate to petition the judiciary not merely for compensation and the 
psychological benefits of vindication but also for the “public airing of disputed facts.”158
154508 U.S. 49, 60-61 (1993).
155Id. at 65.
156Bill Johnson’s Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 737, 743 (1983).
157Id. at 741.
158Id. at 743.
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The Court relied on its antitrust jurisprudence to determine that the Board could only 
enjoin suits brought with a retaliatory motive that were also baseless.159
In its most recent holding, B&K Construction Company v. NLRB, the Court 
further articulated the protection the First Amendment accords litigation.160  There the 
question was whether the NLRB may impose liability on an employer for a retaliatory 
lawsuit that turned out to be unsuccessful.  The Court first suggested that baseless or 
frivolous lawsuits might not be completely unprotected by the First Amendment.  
Analogizing baseless litigation to false statements, the majority noted that “the First 
Amendment requires that we protect some falsehood in order to protect speech that 
matters.”161  Baseless litigation may be protected to ensure that the freedom of speech 
and press receive “breathing space, essential to their fruitful exercise”—a protection 
analogous to that articulated in New York Times v. Sullivan that a public official seeking 
damages for defamation prove that false statements were made with knowledge or 
reckless disregard of their falsity.162  Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion stated that 
these “breathing space” principles were consistent with the Court’s prior cases limiting 
regulation of litigation to “suits that were both objectively and subjectively motivated by 
an unlawful purpose.”163  Ultimately, the Court did not decide the scope of First 
159Id. at 744 (citing California Motor Transport v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 
508 (1972)).
160536 U.S. 516 (2002).
161Id. at 531 emphasis in original quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 
323, 341 (1974).
162Id. (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433).
163Id.
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Amendment protection to be accorded frivolous litigation, since the case involved the 
class of “reasonably based but unsuccessful litigation” which had a retaliatory, anti-union 
motive.164
Justice O’Connor stated that the First Amendment protects all genuine petitions 
and not merely those that are successful.  The “genuineness of a grievance does not 
depend on whether it succeeds.”165  Equally important, the Court articulated the First 
Amendment interests advanced by an unsuccessful but reasonably based suit.  
Unsuccessful suits allow the “public airing of disputed facts . . . and raise matters of 
public concern.  They also promote the evolution of the law by supporting the 
development of legal theories that may not gain acceptance the first time around.”166
Those values—public airing of disputes, raising issues of public concern, 
promoting a community’s own narrative of the law, which may not be accepted by the 
state immediately but which is eventually adopted later on—are values traditionally 
associated with litigation.  The Court in B&K thus recognizes that litigation has 
legitimate and important purposes apart from winning in Court.
Despite its broad invocation of First Amendment values and principles, the 
Court’s actual holding was quite narrow.  The Court avoided deciding the difficult 
constitutional issue of the extent to which the First Amendment protects reasonable, but 
unsuccessful litigation brought with a retaliatory purpose, by adopting a limiting 
construction of the relevant NLRA provision.  Nor did the court decide whether the 
164Id.
165Id. at 532.
166B&K Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 536 U.S. 516, 532 (quoting Bill Johnson’s 
Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 743 (1983)).
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NLRB could sanction an unsuccessful but reasonably based lawsuit which was filed 
solely to impose the costs of the litigation process.  Finally, the Court specifically 
included the caveat that “nothing in our holding today should be read to question the 
validity of common litigation sanctions imposed by courts themselves—such as those 
authorized under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure . . .”167
Taken individually, each of these cases invoking the First Amendment to 
determine the permissible scope of state or congressional regulation of litigation may 
stand for relatively narrow propositions.  But as a whole, these cases have profound 
implications for the role of litigation that seeks not only or even primarily to obtain a 
favorable reply from the government official petitioned—whether it be an Executive 
official or judge—but to provoke public debate and discourse on the subject of the 
petition.  Notwithstanding Justice O’Connor’s caveat concerning Rule 11 and other 
litigation sanctions imposed by courts, the B&K opinion does appear to call into 
constitutional question the use of sanctions against lawyers such as Ramsey Clark or Bill 
Kunstler for bringing litigation to educate the public about important issues.
B. Sanctions and the First Amendment
The use of courts as forums to spark political protest and debate throughout 
American history, and the Supreme Court’s more recent explicit recognition of the first 
amendment values and protections of litigation support the legitimacy of litigation 
brought to achieve these purposes.  Courts must analyze Rule 11 and other similar state 
court sanctions in light of the First Amendment protection accorded litigation.  Yet many 
167B&K Constr., 536 U.S. at 537.
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court decisions, including a recent Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decision, pay no heed to 
First Amendment principles when imposing sanctions on attorneys.168
The authority of judges to sanction attorneys who present frivolous claims, or 
bring non-frivolous claims for what a court terms an improper motive, or seek publicity 
for their clients or causes is the power to determine that certain legal arguments or 
strategies are illegitimate and to use the state’s power to stifle and curtail their 
articulation and development.  During the past two decades, public interest attorneys such 
as prominent Civil Rights advocates Ramsey Clark and Bill Kunstler have been 
sanctioned for what courts termed frivolous claims or improper motives.  In other cases, 
defendants have sought sanctions in an effort to chill litigation, as occurred in the 
litigation challenging the United States policies towards Haitians fleeing persecution in 
that country.  In that case, the government responded to the plaintiffs’ lawsuit by moving 
to impose Rule 11 sanctions against the plaintiffs’ lawyers for bringing a frivolous 
lawsuit.169  That motion was obviously an attempt to chill the lawyers and gave them 
“considerable concern,” although it became moot when the district court granted the 
plaintiffs the relief they sought.170  Many lawyers were so chilled:  a 1980s American 
Judicature Society study found that almost one-third of lawyers representing civil rights 
plaintiffs reported that they had declined to present a claim they believed to be 
168Whitehead v. K-Mart Corp., 332 F.3d 796 (5th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
169Anthony Lewis, Abroad at Home; Mockery of Justice, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 
1992, at A29; Victoria Clawson, Elizabeth Detweller & Laura Ho, Litigating as Law 
Students:  An Inside Look at Haitian Centers Council, 103 Y ALE L.J. 2337, 2343 (1994).
170Harold Hongju Koh, The Human Face of the Haitian Interdiction Program, 33 
VA. J. INT’L LAW. 483, 485 (1993).
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meritorious.”171  While the 1993 Amendments to Rule 11 have significantly ameliorated 
the problem, the text of Rule 11 and its interpretation by some courts still may create a 
chilling effect on public interest litigation.
Rule 11(b)(1) provides that a litigant or lawyer can be sanctioned where a case or 
motion is brought “for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary 
delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.”172  Rule 11(b)(2) requires the attorney 
to certify that the claim or defense or other legal contention are not baseless in that it is 
“warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, 
modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law.”173  The 
requirement that a lawsuit or motion not be presented for an improper purpose raises two 
First Amendment questions.  The first is what is an improper purpose; more specifically 
is a lawsuit that has as either a purpose or primary purpose obtaining publicity for a 
plaintiff’s cause improper.  Second, can a lawsuit that is nonfrivolous nonetheless be 
sanctioned because it was brought in whole or in part for political purposes.  The 
questions are important because, as the social science research explored at the beginning 
of this article demonstrates, many public interest cases, whether successful or 
171Lawrence C. Marshall et al., The Use and Impact of Rule 11, 86 NW. U. L. 
REV. 943, 971 (1991).  An American Judicature Society Study found that lawyers who 
spent most of their time representing plaintiffs in civil rights suits were “far more likely 
to be affected by Rule 11 than other lawyers” and that 31% of lawyers representing civil 
rights plaintiffs reported that they had declined to present a claim they believed to be 
meritorious).  Margaret Z.L. Samer & Carl Tobias, Recent Work of the Civil Rules 
Committee, 52 MONT. L. REV. 307, 313 (1991).  But see Carl Tobias, The 1993 Revision 
of Federal Rule 11, 70 IND. L.J. 171 (1994).
172FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(1).
173FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(2).
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unsuccessful, are brought with an aim of seeking favorable publicity for a plaintiff’s 
cause.  Yet Rule 11 can be read to render such litigation illegitimate and sanctionable.
1. Publicity as an Improper Purpose
The courts have divided on whether a litigant who files an action or a motion 
seeking publicity has an improper purpose under Rule 11(b)(1).  The Second and the 
Ninth Circuits have held that seeking publicity is not an improper purpose—at least for 
claims that are nonfrivolous.  The Second Circuit recently overturned a District Court’s 
imposition of sanctions against litigants who had brought an action with the purpose of 
obtaining publicity to put pressure on defendants:
The district court held that the filing of the complaint with a view to 
exerting pressure on defendants through the generation of adverse and 
economically disadvantageous publicity reflected an improper purpose.  
To the extent that a complaint is not held to lack foundation in law or fact, 
we disagree.  It is not the role of Rule 11 to safeguard a defendant from 
public criticism that may result from the assertion of nonfrivolous claims.  
Further, unless such measures are needed to protect the integrity of the 
judicial system or a criminal defendant’s right to a fair trial, a court’s steps 
to deter attorneys from, or to punish them for, speaking to the press have 
serious First Amendment implications.174
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit rejected sanctions against plaintiffs whose motives were 
arguably to delay and defeat a recall attempt against a city councilman rather than merely 
obtaining the specific voting rights sought in the complaint.  The court held that such a 
174Sussman v. Israel, 56 F.3d 450, 459 (2d Cir. 1995).
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political purpose would not be improper under the Rule.  “[T]he political inspiration for 
the federal lawsuit does not necessarily mean that the action is ‘improper’ within the 
meaning of Rule 11.  Much of the redistricting litigation under the Equal Protection 
Clause has been inspired by those with a transparent political interest.”175
Other courts, however, disagree.  The Fifth Circuit has recently held that an 
attorney can be sanctioned because he had an improper purpose of embarrassing his 
adversary by obtaining adverse publicity.176  That the attorney “orchestrated” a media 
event was strong evidence of his improper purpose which was sanctionable even if the 
action the attorney took was not frivolous.  Some District Courts have also concluded that 
plaintiffs seeking publicity by filing a reasonable complaint constitutes an improper 
purpose.177  The Fourth Circuit suggested in Kunstler that holding a press conference and 
seeking publicity was an improper purpose if that were the plaintiff’s central or primary
purpose in filing the complaint.178
These cases illustrate the confusion surrounding the definition of an improper 
purpose.  Litigation brought that has the purpose of sparking public debate or promoting 
greater public awareness of an issue, or obtaining publicity to put pressure on a 
defendant, should not be viewed as improper.  Nor can the filing of complaints or
175Zalvidar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 828, 831 (9th Cir. 1986).
176Whitehead v. K-Mart Corp., 332 F.3d 796 (5th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
177Bryant v. Brooklyn Barbeque, 130 F.R.D. 665, 669 (W.D. Mo. 1990).
178In re Kunstler, 914 F.2d 505 (4th Cir. 1990).  Kunstler and some other cases 
suggesting that seeking publicity constitutes an improper purpose (but not the Fourth 
Circuit’s decision in Whitehead) occurred in the context of cases the court also found to 
be frivolous.  Therefore those cases are not necessarily inconsistent with the Second and 
Ninth Circuit’s finding that seeking publicity or some other political goal does not 
constitute an improper purpose in the context of nonfrivolous litigation.
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motions through press conferences be viewed as either in “poor taste” or evidence of 
improper purpose; public interest lawyers who file pro bono litigation frequently 
announce their suits in press conferences for the purpose of drawing broad public 
attention to their grievances.179  This type of litigation falls within the core First 
Amendment protection articulated by the court in Button, Primus and B&K, and cannot 
be sanctioned simply because the petition is directed at the public and not simply the 
court.
179See Brief for Petitioner in Gentile v. Nevada at 6.  See also note 44 supra.
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2. Sanctioning Nonfrivolous Lawsuits That Have an Improper 
Purpose
The text and the history of Rule 11 also suggests that a finding of any improper 
motive alone is sufficient for the court to award sanctions.  The Circuit Courts are split on 
this issue.  A number of Circuits have departed from the text of Rule 11(b)(1) and will 
not sanction a plaintiff for filing a nonfrivolous complaint, even if the plaintiff’s purpose 
is improper.180  The Seventh Circuit, on the other hand, has repeatedly ruled that 
sanctions are appropriate where a party has filed a nonfrivolous complaint for an 
improper purpose,181 and the Fifth Circuit recently has concurred in that approach.182
Other circuits, in dictum, have suggested that improper purpose alone can support Rule 
11 sanctions even where a complaint is nonfrivolous.183  A number of District Courts 
have sanctioned plaintiffs based solely on a finding of improper purpose independent of 
an analysis of whether the complaint was nonfrivolous.184
180Townsend v. Holman Consulting Corp., 929 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1991) (en 
banc) Sussman v. Bank of Israel, 56 F.2d 450, 458-59 (2d Cir. 1995); National Assn’ of 
Gov’t Employees v. National Federation of Fed. Employees, 844 F.2d 216, 223-24 (5th 
Cir. 1988) (adopting 9th Circuit rule distinguishing filing a complaint from filing 
subsequent papers in applying improper purpose clause of Rule 11).  Burkhart v. Kinsley 
Bank, 852 F.2d 512, 515 (10th Cir. 1988).  See also Barbara Krwzansky, Note, Sanctions 
for Nonfrivolous Complaints? Sussman v. Bank of Israel, and Implications for the 
Improper Purpose Prong of Rule 11, 61 ALB. L. REV. 1359 (1998).
181Szabo Food Service Inc. v. Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d 1073 (7th Cir. 1987); Mars 
Steel Corp. v. Continental Bank N.A., 880 F.2d 928 (7th Cir. 1989) (en banc); Kapko 
Mfg. Inc. v. C&O Enters, Inc., 886 F.2d 1485, 1491 (7th Cir. 1989).
182Whitehead v. K-Mart Corp., 332 F.3d 796 (5th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
183For example, Justice Breyer, when he sat on the First Circuit joined an opinion 
stating that Rule 11 has been read “to reach groundless but ‘sincere’ pleadings, as well as 
those which, while not devoid of all merit, were filed for some malign purpose.”  
Lanelloli v. Foy, 909 F.2d 15, 18-19 (1st Cir. 1990).  The Third and Eleventh Circuits 
have also suggested that sanctions are appropriate for a complaint filed with improper 
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It seems inconsistent that the First Amendment right of access to Article III courts 
requires that the federal antitrust statute be read to allow regulation only of suits that are 
both objectively baseless and subjectively motivated by an unlawful purpose, yet Rule 11 
can sanction lawsuits that are either objectively baseless or undertaken with an improper 
purpose.  Justice O’Connor suggests that sanctions imposed on litigants by the courts 
themselves, are different than sanctions created by federal law.  Yet it is unclear why the
First Amendment should afford less protection against judicially imposed sanctions,185
since both anti-trust and Rule 11 sanctions may only be imposed by a court after it 
concludes that a lawsuit is “improper.”  Certainly the legislature’s interest in preventing 
anti-competitive or anti-union lawsuits is as important, if not stronger, than the 
judiciary’s interest in preventing frivolous or otherwise improper litigation.  While the 
anti-trust treble-damages remedy may pose a serious chilling effect, so too obviously 
does the potential of Rule 11 sanctions.
3. Frivolous Claims
The Rule 11 requirement that a litigant certify that his or her claims are warranted 
by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification or reversal 
purpose alone.  CTC Imports & Exports v. Nigerian Petroleum Corp., 951 F.2d 573, 578 
(3d Cir. 1991); Didie v. Howes, 988 F.2d 1097, 1104 (11th Cir. 1993) (Rule 11 requires 
sanctions for filing of a frivolous pleading or a pleading in bad faith for an improper 
purpose).  See generally Andrews, supra note 19, at nn.122-25.
184Ballentine v. Taco Bell Corp., 135 F.R.D. 117, 122 (E.D.N.C. 1991) even 
though the plaintiff had made a reasonable inquiry and had a legitimate purpose of 
seeking relief, solely because his improper purpose of harassing defendant outweighed 
the proper one.  In Bryant v. Brooklyn Barbeque Corp., 130 F.R.D. 665 (W.D. Mo. 1990) 
the court found that plaintiff had not made a proper factual inquiry, but even had a 
reasonable basis existed for the filing of the complaint, because it was filed solely for 
publicity and harassment, sanctions were appropriate.
185Saltany v. Reagan, 886 F.2d 438, 440 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
-65-
of existing law or the establishment of new law is equally problematic.  Ironically, the 
replacement of the old subjective, bad faith test with an objective reasonableness test has 
made the amended Rule 11 much more unpredictable.186  Empirical research conducted 
by the Federal Judicial Center found that presented with a number of hypothetical cases, 
judges most often divided almost equally as to whether a case was legally frivolous.187
Experience in actual litigation is consistent with the Center’s research.  District court and 
appellate judges have been unable to agree on whether a case is frivolous.  Circuit courts 
have held that claims that district courts judges sanctioned as frivolous were not merely 
reasonable but winning,188 and that claims District Courts upheld were legally 
frivolous.189  The Supreme Court Justices and circuit court panels have found a claim to 
be so frivolous that no reasonable litigant could believe it meritorious even though strong 
186Linda Ross Meyer, When Reasonable Minds Differ, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1467, 
1483-84 (1996); Bryon C. Keeling, Toward a Balanced Approach to “Frivolous” 
Litigation:  A Critical Review of Federal Rule 11 and State Sanctions Provisions, 21 
PEPP. L. REV. 1067, 1081 (1994).
187SAUL M. KASSIN, AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RULE 11 SANCTIONS (1985).
188Warren v. City of Carlsbad, 58 F.3d 439, 444 (9th Cir. 1995); In re Edmonds, 
924 F.2d 176, 181-82 (10th Cir. 1991); Goldman v. Belden, 754 F.2d 1059 (2d Cir. 
1985); Operating Eng’rs Pension Trust v. A-C Co., 859 F.2d 1336, 1343-44 (9th Cir. 
1988); Trident Ctr. v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 847 F.2d 564, 570 (9th Cir. 1988); 
Cooper v. City of Greenwood, 904 F.2d 302 (5th Cir. 1990); Stevens v. Lawyers Mut. 
Liab. Ins. Co., 784 F.2d 1056, 1060 (4th Cir. 1986); Locomotor USA Inc. v. Korus Co., 
Nos. 93-56032-56622, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 401 at *23-*24 (9th Cir. Jan. 6, 1995).
189Dilley v. United States, No. 93-4225, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 4480 at *5 (10th 
Cir. Mar. 6, 1995); Oil and Gas Futures Inc. v. Andrus, 610 F.2d 287, 288 (5th Cir. 
1980); Sanford Levinson, Frivolous Cases:  Do Lawyers Really Know Anything at All, 24 
OSGOODE HALL L.J. 353, 370-71 (1986) (commenting on circuit court’s opinion that 
plaintiff’s argument was “quite incredible,” but that District Court had apparently 
accepted it and the circuit had to reverse him); Meyer, supra note 186, at 1484 (court 
agreed with sanctioned argument, though controversy moot).
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opinions by their presumably reasonable brethren find that the litigant had stated a valid 
claim.190
Most commentators concur that despite the Rule 11’s attempt to create an 
“objective” standard of frivolous litigation, courts have been unable to develop a 
principled line for determining whether a complaint is so baseless as to be frivolous.191
Indeed, some scholars have argued that the definition of frivolous is fundamentally 
indeterminate,192 or as Professor Sandford Levinson has put it:
It is, I suspect, no coincidence that writers on frivolousness have tended to 
adopt versions of Justice Stewart’s famous (or is the correct word 
190For example in Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5 (1980) the Court reversed a 
dismissal of a prisoner’s petition and the lower court’s award of attorney’s fees against 
the prisoner.  Justice Rehnquist dissented arguing that the prisoner’s claim was totally 
meritless and therefore the “award of attorney’s fees was entirely proper.”  As Mark 
Tushnet has written, “[I]t seems that, in Justice Rehnquist’s view, a claim can be 
‘meritless’ even though six members of the Supreme Court found that it stated a claim on 
which relief could be granted.”  Cited in Levinson, supra note 189, at 377.  See also
Hyde v. Van Wormer, 106 S. Ct. 403, 404 (1985) (damages awarded for frivolous 
petition for certiorari where three Justices believed petition was not frivolous); Tatum v. 
Regents of University of Nebraska, 462 U.S. 1117 (1983) (same); Gullo v. McGill, 462 
U.S. 1101 (1983) (three Justices would have awarded damages for frivolous appeal); Garr 
v. U.S. Healthcare Inc., 22 F.3d 1274, 1281-83 (3d Cir. 1994); Alia v. Michigan Supreme 
Court, 906 F.2d 1100, 1102-03, 1108 (6th Cir. 1990) and cases cited in Meyer, supra
note 186.
191William W. Schwarzer, Rule 11 Revisited, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1013, 1016-17 
(1988).  Meyer, supra note 186; Levinson, supra note 189, at 370; Melissa L. Nelkin, 
Has the Chancellor Shot Himself in the Foot?  Looking for a Middle Ground on Rule 11 
Sanctions, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 383, 384 (1990); George Cochran, Rule 11:  The Road to 
Amendment, 61 MISS. L.J. 5, 8-9 (1991); Charles M. Shaffer, Jr., Rule 11:  Bright Light, 
Dim Future, 7 REV. LITIG. 1, 11 (1987) (“No matter what words are used as the objective 
yardstick, the application of Rule 11 to different facts by different judges inevitably will 
yield inconsistent results.”); Keeling, supra note 186; Rob Attinson, A Dissenter’s 
Commentary on the Professionalism Crusade, 74 TEX. L. REV. 259, 287-90 (1995).
192Meyer, supra note 186.
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“notorious”?) test of pornography, that is “[P]erhaps I could never succeed 
in intelligently [defining it] . . . [b]ut I know it when I see it.”193
Indeterminate or vague legal standards chill speech, and that has been the effect 
on public interest lawyers asserting novel or cutting edge claims.  The vagueness or 
indeterminancy of the test for frivolous is evident in cases where a court imposes 
sanctions upon a finding that “the case offered no hope whatsoever of success.”194  But 
the “no chance of success” standard inherently mixes law and politics indeterminately, 
forcing attorneys to decide whether an argument is legally reasonable based on whether 
anybody believes in the contemporary political environment any court would adopt it.  
This suggests that the frequent litigation brought by Black litigants in the early 1900s 
attacking Plessy195 would have been sanctionable since surely any “reasonable” observer 
would agree that there was no chance of success whatsoever.
Northwestern Law School Professor Anthony D’Amato has argued that the 
Libyan plaintiffs in Saltany had a legitimate legal argument that the United States and 
Great Britain bombing of Libya constituted a war crime that should not be accorded 
193Levinson, supra note 189, at 370.  See also R. Hermann, Frivolous Criminal 
Appeals, 47 N.Y.U. L. REV. 701, 705 (1972) (“frivolousness, like madness and obscenity, 
is more readily recognized than cogently defined”).  Report of the Special Committee to 
Consider Sanctions for Frivolous Litigation in New York State Courts, reprinted in 18 
FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 3, 12 (1990) (“The circularity of the [objective tests] definition, 
however, inevitably leads to and invites subjective decisionmaking.”).
194Saltany, 886 F.2d 483 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (per curiam); Buckley, Ginsburg, and 
Sentelle, cert. denied, 495 U.S. 932 (1990).  See also B&K Construction, 536 U.S. 516 
and Professional Real Estate Investors, 508 U.S. at 65 (articulating that test).  One 
commentator asserts that the test of “absolutely no chance of success” is the “prevailing 
approach” of many courts to frivolousness.  Schwarzer, supra note 191, at ___.
195Gladys Tignor Peterson, The Present Status of the Negro Separate School as 
Defined by Court Decisions, 41 J. NEGRO EDUCATION 351-74 (July 1935).
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immunity under the Nuremberg precedent established by the United States after World 
War II.196  The reason that a reasonable observor could determine that the Saltany 
litigation was hopeless was not because of the unreasonableness or frivolousness of the 
plaintiffs’ legal argument.  Rather, it was the political and legal reality that United States 
courts have refused to apply the Nuremberg precedent and more generally international 
law norms against United States officials in U.S. courts.  Nor should Salmon Chase have 
been sanctioned for appealing the Van Zandt case to the Supreme Court, nor the Women 
Suffrage Movement for continuing the Minor litigation in the Supreme Court, despite the 
certainty in both cases that they would lose.  Both cases were presenting arguable legal 
theories that resonated with a substantial sector of the American public, if not with the 
contemporary court to which they argued.
The 1993 Amendments to Rule 11 sought to blunt the criticism that the threat of 
sanctions had discouraged novel litigation.197  The Advisory Committee made clear the 
broad latitude to be given novel legal claims, stating that courts should “consider whether 
the litigant has support for its theories even in minority opinions in, law reviews, or 
through consultation with other lawyers.”198  Similarly, some courts have discarded the 
approach that looks at the objective frivolousness of plaintiffs’ claims in favor of an 
196D’Amato, supra note 10.
197The Advisory Committee found support for the criticism of the rule that “it 
occasionally has created problems for a party which seeks to assert novel legal 
contentious.”  Tobias, supra note 171, at 180 (citing Advisory Committee Report).
198FED. R. CIV. P. 11 Advisory Committee’s note reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 583, 
586-87.
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approach that analyzes whether the attorney’s research and preparation of the litigation or 
motion was objectively reasonably.199
Read properly, the Rule immunizes litigators who bring reasonably researched 
and thought out claims arguing claims on an issue of public importance.  That is because 
a colorable argument can be constructed for virtually any proposition:  Chase’s argument 
that the Fugitive Slave Law was unconstitutional,200 Professor Joseph Singer’s argument 
that socialism is implied in the Constitution,201 Professor Gary Lawson’s argument that 
“the modern administrative state openly flouts almost every important structural precept 
of the American constitutional order,”202 or my own argument that the political branches 
of government are constitutionally bound by the fundamental precepts of international 
law.203  If these propositions are not frivolous, and the Advisory Committee’s notes 
suggest that they should not be so considered, what claims are frivolous?  As one 
commentator has noted “it is extremely difficult in practice, if not impossible in principle, 
to devise an ‘extension, modification or reversal’ exception that does not devour the 
‘unwarranted by existing law’ rule.”204
199Meyer, supra note 186, at 1487-91.  Mars Steel Corp. v. Continental Bank, 880 
F.2d 928, 932-33 (7th Cir. 1989).  See also Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 
384, 401-02 (1990) (suggesting that key inquiry is reasonableness of investigation).
200See pp. ___-___ supra.
201Joseph W. Singer, The Player and the Cards:  Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 
YALE L.J. 1, 22-23 (1984).
202Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. 
REV. 1231, 1233 (1994).
203Jules Lobel, The Limits of Constitutional Power:  Conflicts Between Foreign 
Policy and International Law, 71 VA. L. REV. 1071 (1985).
204Attinson, supra note 191, at 288.
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Remarkably, many court decisions have not even recognized the applicability of 
the First Amendment in the Rule 11 context.  For example the Court of Appeals’ decision 
in Saltany never mentioned the First Amendment when it held that sanctions were 
required because federal courts do not properly “serve as a forum for protests.”205
The indeterminacy of a determination whether a claim is objectively frivolous 
requires a recognition that the First Amendment protects lawyers who make losing 
arguments about real harms and important values in order to promote public dialogue.  
The First Amendment requires some protection or “breathing space” for frivolous 
lawsuits, particularly those that reflect core First Amendment values of presenting 
important issues of public concern, just as the Amendment precludes public officials 
from recovering damages for defamation unless they can prove actual malice.206  For a 
court to sanction a legal argument as “objectively frivolous” is to determine that it is 
beyond the pale, beyond discussion in the courtroom.207  That the law, like truth, is not 
static, requires that the remedy for a legal petition deemed “frivolous” is to respond to it, 
not sanction it.
As a New York Bar Association Committee eloquently stated:
Access to the court system is a basic tenet of the American legal and 
historical tradition.  A sanctions provision which exerts a chilling 
influence on creative counsel does violence to this tradition.  The sanction 
of dismissal or the denial of relief by the court is a sufficient safeguard.  
205Saltany, 886 F.2d at 440.
206B&K, 536 U.S. 516, 531.
207Meyer, supra note 186, at 1492.
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Indeed, in our common law tradition, it is bad public policy to provide 
judges with a tool that would permit them not only to dismiss an action, 
but also to sanction the losers when in their view the claims or theories 
were frivolous.208
C. The Appropriate Role of Lawyers in the Court of Public Opinion:  
Sanctions for Attorney’s Speech
A model that views litigation as a forum for educating the public also raises 
questions as to the appropriate role of lawyers as advocates outside the courtroom.  That a 
lawyer should not argue his or her case outside the courtroom has long been articulated as 
a basic obligation of the legal profession.209  That view ignores the long tradition in 
American law recounted above of prominent lawyers arguing important law reform cases 
not merely in the courts of law, but in the court of public opinion.
The explosion in the media’s attention to the law, particularly in such high profile, 
high publicity trials as the murder trial of Sam Sheppard in the 1960s and the O.J. 
Simpson trial in the 1990s, has sparked a vigorous debate over the circumstances in 
208Report, FORDHAM URBAN L.J., supra note 193, at 8-9.  The committee 
recommended a standard that would impose sanctions only for abusive conduct, not 
frivolous claims position that ought to be the rule:  that conduct sanctionable ought to be 
abusive rather than frivolous, which it defined abusive conduct as conduct “undertaken or 
omitted primarily to delay or prolong unreasonably the resolution of the litigation or to 
harass or maliciously injure another.”  Id. at 12. That recommendation has not been 
adopted by the New York courts.
209See Note, Legal Spin Control:  Ethics and Advocacy in the Court of Public 
Opinion, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1811 (1995) [hereinafter Legal Spin Control].  See, for 
example, Canons of Professional Ethics, Canon 20 (1908), in American Bar Association, 
Selected Statutes, Rules and Standards on the Legal Profession 237 (1990) (“Newspaper 
publications by a lawyer as to pending or anticipated litigation may interfere with a fair 
trial in the courts and otherwise prejudice the due administration of justice.  Generally 
they are to be condemned.”).
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which a lawyer may engage in extrajudicial advocacy.  Some courts, commentators and 
leaders of the bar have urged that a lawyer’s proper function is to “present his (or her) 
case in the courtroom, not . . . to build a favorable climate of public opinion,” and would 
permit rules narrowly limiting the circumstances in which a lawyer may present her 
client’s case to the public.210  Other judges and commentators have concluded that an 
attorney’s advocacy for his client outside the courtroom is both legitimate and strongly 
protected by the First Amendment.  They would strictly limit the restrictions the bar and 
judiciary may place on such speech as those necessary to protect against a clear and 
present danger to the administration of justice.211
Rule 3.6 of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, adopted in 1983 and 
then amended in 1994, attempts to weave a compromise between the competing views, 
yet is significantly more protective of lawyers’ speech than the rules contained in the 
older Model Code of Professional Responsibility.212  While the Model Code sees little 
public value in attorneys’ extrajudicial speech, the commentary to the Model Rule 
recognizes that “there are vital social interests served by the free dissemination of 
210See American Bar Association, Standards Relating to Fair Trial and Free Press, 
92 (1966); State v. Van Duyne, 204 A.2d 841, 852 (N.J. 1964); Rum Creek Coal Sales, 
Inc. v. Caperton, 31 F.3d 169, 176 (4th Cir. 1994).
211See ABA Standards Relating to the Administration of Criminal Justice, Fair 
Trial and Free Press (1978); Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242 (7th 
Cir. 1975); Gentile v. State Bar, 501 U.S. 1030, 1035 (opinion of Kennedy, J.) (1991); 
Chemerinsky, supra note 51, at 859 (arguing that current rules and gag orders limiting 
attorneys’ speech fail strict scrutiny); Joel H. Swift, Model Rule 3.6:  An Unconstitutional 
Regulation of Defense Attorney Trial Publicity, 64 B.U. L. REV. 1003 (1984).
212For example, the Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 7-107 (1988), 
stated that it is the duty of a lawyer not to release information or opinion “if there is a 
reasonable likelihood that such dissemination would interfere with a fair trial,” while the 
newer Model Rules provide that the lawyer shall not make an extrajudicial statement if it 
“will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding.”
-73-
information about events having legal consequences and about the legal proceedings 
themselves.”213
Both lawyers’ use of the media and restrictions on lawyers’ speech have become 
increasingly common in the last few decades.214  The battle has become particularly 
intense over restrictions on criminal defense attorneys’ speech in the context of an 
ongoing or pending criminal trial.  In Gentile v. State Bar, the Supreme Court narrowly 
divided 5-4 on the First Amendment standard to be applied to attorney speech.  Writing 
for the majority, Justice Rehnquist upheld a Nevada Rule that was based on Model Rule 
3.6 which prohibited a lawyer from making “an extrajudicial statement that a reasonable 
person would expect to be disseminated by means of public communication if the lawyer 
knows or reasonably should know that it will have a substantial likelihood of materially 
prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding.”215  The Court held that the First Amendment did 
not require the state to meet a “clear and present danger” standard before disciplining an 
attorney for public pronouncements about a pending criminal trial, but permitted such 
discipline upon a lesser showing of “substantial likelihood of material prejudice.”216  The 
court balanced the general First Amendment interests in information about criminal trials 
against “the basic premise of our legal system . . . that lawsuits should be tried in court, 
not in the media.”217  Writing for four Justices, Justice Kennedy would have applied the 
213Compare Model Code of Professional Responsibility EC-33 (1988), with 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.6, comment 1 (1994).
214Chemerinsky, supra note 51; Legal Spin Control, supra note 209.
215501 U.S. 1062 (1991).
216Id. at 1071-76.
217Id. at 1080 n.6, 1070-71.
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First Amendment clear and present danger test to state prohibitions on attorney speech, 
and not the more deferential balancing test of the majority.  Kennedy rejected the state’s 
argument that attorney contact with the press during the pendency of a trial somehow “is 
inimical to the attorney’s proper role,” and pointed out that the State’s disciplinary rules 
did not posit any inconsistency between an attorney’s role and discussions with the 
press.218  Moreover, Kennedy recognized the legitimacy, value and even necessity in 
some circumstances of attorneys’ commentary to the press.  For attorneys hold “unique 
qualifications as a source of information about pending cases,” and that in some 
circumstances, an attorney’s “press comment is necessary to protect the rights of the 
client and prevent abuse of the courts.”219
Despite the majority view that lawyer’s speech about pending cases can be 
regulated under a less demanding First Amendment standard, the court nonetheless 
reversed the State’s discipline of the lawyer for his comments to the press.  A majority of 
the Court, including Justice O’Connor, who had joined Justice Rehnquist’s opinion on the 
First Amendment standard to be used, found the Disciplinary Rule, as interpreted by the 
Nevada Supreme Court, void for vagueness.  Attorney Gentile had carefully researched 
the rule and had attempted to comply with its safe harbor immunity for a lawyer to “state 
without elaboration the general nature of the . . . defense.”220  In its vagueness 
determination, the court held that the First Amendment required the state to regulate 
lawyer’s speech clearly enough to avoid the suppression of speech critical of those who 
218Id. at 1056 (Kennedy, J.).
219Id. at 1056-57, 1058-59.
220Nevada Supreme Court Rule 177(3)(a) (1991).
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enforce the law, a requirement particularly relevant to the regulation of “the criminal 
defense bar, which has the professional mission to challenge actions of the state.”  In a 
sense, the Court’s vagueness holding in Gentile is similar to court opinions in the Rule 11 
arena that would not sanction well researched complaints because they meet the stand of 
objective reasonableness, even if a court might find that the claims they presented had no 
chance of success.221
The Supreme Court’s Gentile decision thus reflects the deep division within the 
Bar about the legitimacy of and protection to be accorded attorney speech.  While Gentile
and most other attorney speech cases occur in the context of a criminal case, Model Rule
3.6 at issue in Gentile is applicable to civil cases also,222 and there have been attempts to 
sanction or gag attorneys or litigants in conjunction with public interest civil litigation 
such as environmental litigation.223
221Id. at 1051.  Compare with Mars Steel Corp. v. Continental Bank, 880 F.2d at 
932-33.
222Rule 3.6 speaks of prejudice to any adjudicative proceeding, including civil 
trials.  However, the commentary makes clear that the nature of the proceeding is relevant 
to a determination of prejudice, with a prejudicial effect of a statement much less likely in 
civil and non-jury trials.  The older Model Code specifically precluded a lawyer from 
making an extrajudicial statement that would be disseminated relating “to his opinion as 
to the merits of the claims or defenses of a party, or any other matter reasonably likely to 
interfere with a fair trial . . . .”  DR 7-107(G).
223See Colorado Supreme Court Grievance Committee v. District Court, City and 
County of Denver, 850 P.2d 150 (Colo. 1993) wherein an attorney for an environmental 
group was investigated by the Colorado Office of Disciplinary Counsel in connection 
with the attorney’s speaking at a Press Conference about a law suit the group had filed 
and his giving interviews to the press.  See also Jennifer L. Johnson, Empowerment 
Lawyering:  The Role of Trial Publicity in Environmental Justice, 23 B.C. ENVT’L AFF. 
L. REV. 567, 590-93 (1996) (describing Colorado case) (the attorney was not sanctioned 
and the Colorado rule changed to make it more difficult to sanction attorneys).  See also
Ruggieri v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 503 F. Supp. 1036 (D.R.I. 1980) (sanctions 
sought for attorneys’ extrajudicial comments concerning asbestos litigation); Iowa 
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Sanctions have generally been rejected in the civil litigation context.  Attorneys 
who bring and speak publicly about civil litigation with the purpose of furthering public 
education and public debate are protected by the First Amendment and not subject to 
sanction under the Rules of Professional Conduct.  The civil litigation problem presents 
an analytically different balancing than the tension described by the Model Rules and 
cases such as Gentile.  The Model Rules and other state rules are premised on a balance 
of the Sixth Amendment interests in the fair administration of justice versus the First 
Amendment interests of the lawyers and public in speech directed at or likely to influence 
juries.  But frequently, particularly in the litigation model described in this article, 
attorney publicity is not directed at the court at all.  Rather it is aimed at influencing non-
judicial actors, general public opinion, executive officials, defendants or industry 
officials.224  This type of speech simply does not raise the same type of concerns that
speech by lawyers aimed at helping their clients win a jury verdict does.
More fundamentally, the increasing recognition of the role of litigation in 
furthering public debate and shaping public opinion requires that lawyers be accorded the 
strongest First Amendment protection in commenting on civil litigation.  Several courts 
have reached that conclusion.  In the 1975 case of Chicago Council of Lawyers v. 
Bauer,225 the Seventh Circuit held the Model Code’s Disciplinary Rule governing 
lawyers’ extrajudicial statements in civil trials unconstitutional.  The court noted 
Supreme Ct. v. Visser, 629 N.W.2d 376 (2001); Barley v. Lesjack, 852 F.2d 93 (3d Cir. 
1988).
224Legal Spin Control, supra note 209, at 1834-41.
225Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. 
denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976).
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numerous differences between civil and criminal cases with respect to the likelihood of 
lawyers’ extrajudicial speech prejudicing the trial.  The court also found the “nature of 
certain civil litigation” important:
As plaintiffs indicate, in our present society in any important social issues 
become entangled to some degree in civil litigation.  Indeed, certain civil 
litigation may be instigated for the very purpose of gaining information 
for the public.  Often actions are brought on behalf of the public interest 
on a private attorney general theory.  Civil litigation in general often 
exposes the need for government action or correction.  Such revelations 
should not be kept from the public.  Yet it is normally only the attorney 
who will have this knowledge or realize its significance . . . .  Therefore, 
we should be extremely skeptical about any rule that silences that voice.226
The Fourth Circuit and other courts have been unanimous in reaching the same 
conclusion.227
Advocacy in the court of public opinion has become a norm of the legal 
profession.228  Many high-powered criminal defense and civil litigators engage in what 
226522 F.2d 242 at 257-58 (emphasis added).
227 Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d 356, 373 (4th Cir. 1979) (“Civil actions may also 
involve questions of public concern such as the safety of a particular stretch of highway, 
the need of the government to exercise its power of eminent domain, or the means of 
racially integrating schools and colleges.  The lawyers involved in such cases can often 
enlighten public debate.”); Wachsman v. Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of 
Ohio, 1991 U.S. Dist. Lexis 20899 (Sept. 30, 1991); Ruggieri v. Johns-Manville Products 
Corp., 503 F. Supp. 1036, 1039 (D.R.I. 1980).  See also Bailey v. Lesjack, 852 F.2d 93 
(3d Cir. 1988) (vacating order that applied local rule restricting defendants in a civil case 
from commenting).
228Legal Spin Control, supra note 209, at 1830.
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one attorney calls “political litigation,” in which they rely on a public relations strategy to 
protect their clients’ interests.229  As one commentator notes, “for a public figure, the real 
concern from the legal action may not be the legal result but the press coverage.”230  The 
reaction to Gentile was to further amend the professional rules to ensure that lawyers’ 
speech would not be chilled.231  Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion discounting the need 
for extrajudicial advocacy has been strongly criticized by commentators for failing to 
recognize the realities of modern practice.232
229 Comment made by Leonard Garment, a high powered Washington lawyer; 
Susanne A. Roschwalb & Richard A. Stack, Litigation Public Relations, COMM. & L., 
Dec. 1992 at 3, 12 Legal Spin Control, supra note 209, at 1838.
230Legal Spin Control, supra note 209, at 1830.
231For example, in 1994, the Model Rules were significantly amended to permit 
more attorney speech.  See Comment, The New Model Rule 3.6:  An Old Pair of Shoes, 
44 KAN. L. REV. 837 (1996).  See also Committee on Professional Responsibility, Ass’n 
of the Bar of the City of N.Y., The Need for Fair Trials Does Not Justify a Disciplinary 
Rule that Broadly Restricts an Attorney’s Speech, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 881 (1993) 
(calling for rule that applies only short time before trial).  A number of states tried to 
protect the ability of lawyers to speak to the press without fear of discipline.  Esther 
Berkowitz-Caballero, Note, In the Aftermath of Gentile:  Reconsidering the Efficacy of 
Trial Publicity Rules, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 404, 545 (1993).  Colorado changed its rule 
from “substantially likely” to “likely to create a grave danger of imminent and substantial 
harm.”  See ABA/BNA LAWYERS’ MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, TRIAL 
PUBLICITY 181 (1994) [hereinafter ABA/BNA LAWYERS’ MANUAL].  Illinois, North 
Dakota and Oregon also adopted language requiring imminent harm.  See id. See also
Alberto Bernabe-Riefkohl, Silence is Golden:  The New Illinois Rules on Attorney 
Extrajudicial Speech, 33 ain LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 323 (2002).  California, in adopting its 
first trial publicity rule, set a “clear and present danger” test.  Id.
232See, e.g., Chemerinsky supra note 51; Berkowitz-Caballero, supra note 231; L. 
Cooper Campbell, Gentile v. State Bar & Model Rule 3.6:  Overly Broad Restrictions on 
Attorney Speech and Pretrial Publicity, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 583 (1993); Lynn S. 
Fulstone, Note, Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada:  Trial in the “Court of Public Opinion” 
and Coping with Model Rule 3.6—Where Do We Go From Here?, 37 VILL. L. REV. 619 
(1992); Michael W. McTigue, Jr., Case Comment, Court Got Your Tongue?  Limitations 
on Attorney Speech in the Name of Federalism:  Gentile v. State Bar, 72 B.U. L. REV.
657 (1992); Lester Porter, Jr., Note, Leaving Your Free Speech Rights at the Bar—
Gentile v. State Bar, 67 WASH. L. REV. 733 (1992); Andrew Blum, Left Speechless, 
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These developments suggest that a model that views an important function of 
litigation to educate the public on matters of important social concern has gained 
legitimacy in recent decades.  Judicial acceptance of this function should lead to a 
recognition that lawyers’ extrajudicial speech in both civil and criminal matters is 
legitimate and must be governed by the strict First Amendment clear and present danger 
test and not by some lesser standard.  A lawyer’s speech on pending litigation performs 
an important social and political function protected by the First Amendment, and only 
when it can be demonstrated that there is some serious and imminent threat to the fair 
administration of justice should that speech be constrained.
IV. The Courts as Protests for Forum and the Law Dilemma Between Articulation of 
Norms and Their Enforcement
One important difference between the courts as forums for protest model and the 
public law litigation model set forth by Chayes is the diminished role that judicial relief 
plays in the former.  The judicial role required by the courts as public forums model is 
often significantly more minimalist than that presented by the institutional or structural 
law reform model.  While the centerpiece of the international law reform model was the 
decree which attempts to restructure or change institutions, judges can and do utilize a 
myriad of much less assertive mechanisms to aid and not obstruct litigants who seek to 
utilize courts as public forums.
The judiciary’s intervention in restructuring or supervising institutions such as 
schools, prisons or mental hospitals has been one focus of much of the scholarly and 
legislative criticism of and debate over law reform litigation.  Indeed, Professor Fiss 
NAT’L L.J., Jan. 18, 1993, at 1; Monroe Freedman, Silencing Defense Lawyers, LEGAL 
TIMES, May 6, 1991, at 22.
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claimed that the core dilemma of structural reform litigation was the tension between 
“declaration” of a norm and its “actualization” in a decree.233  Plaintiffs’ use of courts as 
forums to further public debate and dialogue presents relatively unexplored and 
underutilized alternatives for judges grappling with that dilemma.
There is an inherent dialectic tension between the court’s roles of creating legal 
meaning and exercising its power.234  I define the creation of legal meaning to be the 
court’s articulation of norms, within the context of particular narratives or stories that 
give those norms context and texture.  Conversely, the court exercises its power by 
ordering or failing to order those brought before it to do something.
These dual functions of the judiciary are both distinct yet inextricably connected.  
Normally the Court creates constitutional meaning and articulates constitutional principle 
in the context of exercising its power to either grant or deny relief, whether it be in the 
form of an equitable decree or award of damages.  There are judicial decisions where the 
connection between the court’s dual functions are radically separated:  a court may issue 
an order with no rationales articulating its reasoning, or a court may abstractly articulate 
norms with no interest of ever enforcing them.  Between these two poles lies a multitude 
of gradations.
Plaintiffs who use courts primarily to further a public dialogue or political 
movement draw the legal system directly into the political arena, and by doing so strain 
233Fiss, supra note 3, at 53.  See also Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, 
Destabilization Rights:  How Public Law Litigation Succeeds , 117 HARV. L. REV. 1015, 
1053-56 (2004) (describing tension between rights and remedy in public law litigation).
234Constitutional theorists have often describe the tension I describe between 
meaning and power as one between rights and remedies.  Dory L.J. Levinson, Rights 
Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 857, 861-74 (1999); Fiss, 
supra note 3, at 52-53.
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the connection between the articulation of meaning and the exercise of power.  These 
forums of protest cases lend themselves to the possibility of a court articulating a 
constitutional principle yet refusing to act on that principle in the particular case before it.  
The Court would do so to further the plaintiffs’ goal of increasing the public’s 
understanding of the constitutional principles involved, to lend its weight and prestige to 
the public dialogue on the constitutional values at issue, and to put pressure on Executive 
officials or other defendants to comply with its constitutional vision.  Yet at the same 
time the court would yield to a complex assortment of political, social, ethical, practical 
and legal reasons to refuse to order the defendant to comply with the constitutional 
principle the court invokes.
I admit that articulating and exploring this potential schizophrenic or dialectical 
judicial role in cases wherein the court’s jurisdiction has been invoked at least in part as a 
forum for protest leaves me deeply troubled and conflicted.  It raises a host of practical 
and theoretical questions that go to the heart of our most basic constitutional doctrines 
about the role and function of Article III Courts and of judges more generally.  Does this 
judicial mechanism allow judges to avoid their own struggle between the myriad of 
social, psychological, ideological and jurisprudential factors that are involved in making 
difficult decisions such as whether to allow the government to execute a prisoner, initiate 
a war, or prohibit gay marriage?  If used more often, will it provide judges with a 
justification to avoid confronting the government’s unconstitutional actions?  Does it 
constitute an advisory opinion, something forbidden by two centuries of judicial case-or-
controversy doctrine?  Will it lead to judicial denunciation of government action in 
principle while permitting such action in practice, which as Professor Larry Tribe has 
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noted is inconsistent “with an Anglo-American legal system that has long insisted that 
law be composed of enforceable norms” and “seems to teach mostly hypocrisy.”235
Illustrative of the conflict I feel in proposing this court as a “teacher to the 
citizenry” approach, is that one of its most articulate and eloquent expositions came from 
Alexander Bickel, who argued that the Court must recognize the “passive virtues” of 
refusing to decide certain cases.  For Bickel,
Even when it is ultimately constrained to yield to necessity, however—to 
yield, this is to say, to the judgment of the political institutions—the court 
can exert immense influence.  It may be unable to wield its ultimate power 
as an organ of government charged with translating principle into positive 
law:  but it need not abandon its concomitant role of “teacher to the 
citizenry.”  The power to which Marshall successfully laid claim is not the 
full measure of the Court’s authority in our day.  And the Court’s 
arguments need not be compulsory in order to be compelling.  Many of the 
devices of not doing engage the concept, as I have shown, in colloquies 
235LAURENCE H. TRIBE, ABORTION:  THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 73-84 (1992).  
Professor Glendon had argued in support of the French statute and other similar European 
approaches which (a) recognize as a basic principle that a fetus is “a human life which 
must be protected”; (b) require the woman to undergo counseling before obtaining an 
abortion; and (c) nonetheless permit abortion within a certain period after pregnancy (in 
France 10 weeks) and in many cases require social security to pay for the abortion.  This 
standard generally allows women who want an abortion within the first 10 weeks of 
pregnancy to obtain one, and does not attempt to coerce poor women to go to term, as 
United States law does.  See MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE LAW IN 
WESTERN LAW:  AMERICAN FAILURES, EUROPEAN CHALLENGES (1989).  See also
German abortion decisions reprinted in VICKI C. JACKSON & MARK TUSHNET, 
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 115-39 (1999).  Tribe responded to Glendon’s 
support for a European approach with the argument that the “codification of a truly empty 
promise . . . whose vision is belied by the people’s day-to-day experience . . . can take an 
unacceptably high toll on confidence in the rule of law and the integrity of the legal 
system as a whole.”  Tribe id.; JACKSON & TUSHNET, supra at 141.
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with the political institutions . . . .  But the Court . . . can see to it that the 
political judgment of necessity is undertaken with awareness of the 
principle on which it impinges.236
The Court’s use of the political question doctrine and similar prudential and 
jurisdictional devices to avoid reaching difficult constitutional questions is a device that 
should be minimized, and not affirmed.  Cases presenting deeply felt protests against 
important government or corporate policies often present courts with difficult dilemmas 
and choices between the demands for justice and the judges’ perceived limitations on 
their role, function or ability to confront that injustice.  These cases require the Court to 
carefully negotiate the ever-changing fault line between what the law is and ought to be, 
and not retreat behind formalistic or other jurisprudential rationales to avoid seriously 
grappling with the moral and legal issues the cases present.
Yet often the cultural, legal and political milieu of a judge makes such an 
approach difficult if not impossible for a judge freighted with the baggage of her era to 
actualize.  As Robert Cover demonstrated in his book Justice Accused, prominent anti-
slavery judges felt constrained by their era’s jurisprudential tools, or what he termed their 
“juristic competence,”—which severely limited their range of responses to the moral-
formal dilemmas presented by slavery.237  Judges such as John McLean, when confronted 
by ideological advocates such as Salmon Chase who challenged the dissonance between 
their antislavery ideology and their judicial support for a system that returned runaway 
slaves to their owners sought refuge in a set of mainly formalist rationales.  While 
236ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, THE SUPREME 
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 187-88 (1962).
237COVER, supra note 75, at 258-59.
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Cover’s study is a careful analysis of the specific historical, cultural and legal 
assumptions and environment facing these judges, it obviously has broader implications.  
For throughout American history, judges have continually confronted the moral and legal 
dilemmas that Cover addresses, and have often responded with similar rationales of 
deference to formal law, or to perceived necessity to defer to political or military choices 
made by the Executive or Congress, or fear of too radically challenging an established 
constitutional framework and the social order it protects.  Cover’s study itself stemmed 
from an analogy he had made between judicial complicity in slavery and judicial 
acquiescence in the crimes of the Vietnam War.  The 20th century has witnessed many 
similar judicial articulations of powerlessness when confronted by claims of injustice; the 
internment of Japanese-Americans during World War II,238 the sending of American 
soldiers to kill and be killed in Vietnam,239 or a myriad of other challenges to injustice 
that were disposed of formalistically with the court eschewing responsibility such as 
DeShaney v. Winnebago County,240 McClesky v. Kemp,241 San Antonio Independent 
School District v. Rodriguez,242 or Harris v. McRae.243  Nor has judicial deference to and 
238Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
239See, e.g., Mitchell v. United States, 386 U.S. 972 (1967) (Douglas, J., 
dissenting from denial or certiorari); Rodric B. Schoen, A Strong Silence, Vietnam and 
the Supreme Court, 33 WASHBURN L.J. 275 (1994); Warren F. Schwartz & Wayne 
McCormack, The Justiciability of Legal Objections to the American Military Effort in 
Vietnam, 46 TEX. L. REV. 1033 (1968); Atlee v. Laird, 347 F. Supp. 689 (E.D. Pa. 1972), 
aff’d sub nom. without opinion Atlee v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 911 (1973).
240489 U.S. 189 (1989).
241481 U.S. 279 (1987).
242411 U.S. 1 (1973).
243448 U.S. 297 (1980).
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acquiescence in the unjust assertion of power by the political branches has not been 
confined to judges who articulate positivist, formalist jurisprudence, but has plagued 
judges such as Justice Felix Frankfurter steeped in a modern realistic model law.  The 
perceived needs to defer to power overwhelmed even those Justices such as Brennan and 
Marshall who normally fought against narrow, mechanistic legal perspectives, when 
confronted with a great intractable national issue such as Vietnam.
In Justice Accused and other works, Cover suggested some approaches that judges 
could apply to the dilemmas faced by the anti-slavery judges.244  So too, Professor 
Richard Abel’s study of South African judges’ responses to litigation challenging aspects 
of the apartheid system in that country illustrates that even in time of great repression in 
which a nation’s legal structure supported an unjust social structure, judges do have 
choices and can creatively and flexibly work within the fissures and contradictions of the 
legal system to undermine, not prop up the unjust regime.245  But might one such creative 
and flexible solution to the dilemmas judges face lie in a court’s use of whatever fissure 
exists between its power to order compliance with rules, and its authority to set forth the 
principles upon which the government and private organizations ought to act?  When is it 
appropriate for a court to speak truth to power, yet not directly confront power with its 
244For example, in Justice Accused, Cover argued that “in a dynamic model, law 
is always becoming.  And the judge has a legitimate role in determining what it is that the 
law will become.  The flux in law means also that the law’s content is frequently unclear.  
[T]his frequent lack of clarity makes possible “ameriolist” solutions.  The judge may 
introduce his own sense of what “ought to be” interstically, where no “hard” law yet 
exists.  And, he may do so without committing the law to broad doctrinal advances . . . .”  
COVER, supra note 75, at 6.
245RICHARD ABEL, POLITICS BY OTHER MEANS (1995).
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own power?  Can a court sidesteps a direct confrontation with authority, but nonetheless 
get its message heard by the public and the government.
A case that best illustrates the potential usefulness and pitfalls of this approach is 
Dellums v. Bush.246  That case involved a challenge by 54 Democratic members of 
Congress and one senator to enjoin President George H.W. Bush from going to war 
against Iraq to expel it from Kuwait without the congressional authorization required by 
Article I, Section 8, Clause 11 of the Constitution.  I was the lead counsel for plaintiffs.  
The case was filed by Congressman Dellums and the other representatives because they 
believed such a war would violate the Constitution, and thought that a court might agree.  
But win or lose, they were sure the lawsuit would shake people up and provide an 
opportunity to educate the public.  Congressman Dellums later recounted his 
conversations with members of Congress who were unsure whether they wished to join 
the lawsuit as plaintiffs:  “I told them even if we don’t win in court, maybe we’ll win in 
the courtrooms and living rooms of America, where this case will eventually be tried.”247
The case was assigned to Judge Harold Greene of the District Court of the District 
of Columbia.  The son of a German-Jewish jeweler, Greene had escaped from the Nazis 
with his family in 1939 and came to the United States.  After the war and his service in 
Army Intelligence, Greene attended law school and joined the Justice Department.  A 
strong advocate of civil rights, his most lasting contribution as justice was his role in 
drafting the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965.  Appointed to 
246Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141 (D.D.C. 1990).
247Interview by author with Congressman Ronald V. Dellums (Washington, D.C., 
Oct. 1996).
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the federal bench in 1978 by President Carter, Greene was considered an excellent 
judge—smart, fair and in control of the courtroom.
A month after his appointment to the federal bench, Greene was assigned his first, 
and probably most important case, United States v. AT&T.  For the next six years, Greene 
presided over litigation that led in the end to the breakup of the AT&T monopoly over the 
telephone industry.  He masterfully handled the complex case, which some antitrust 
experts thought was too difficult for any single court, rising to the challenge and 
dominating the courtroom.  Greene was independent, and undaunted by a big political 
case.
The pressures and tensions Judge Greene faced in the Dellums case were 
enormous.  Yet his dilemma was very different from that faced by Judge McClean when 
confronting Chase in the Van Zandt case.  Judges like McClean were torn by their 
obligations to uphold what they saw as a static, formal law and their moral duty as anti-
slavery advocates.  In Van Zandt and other cases, McLean chose the former.
At oral argument, Judge Greene was clearly troubled by his inclination that the 
formal law—the Constitution’s text and the framers’ intent—strongly supported the
plaintiffs’ position that the Executive did not have the unilateral power to initiate a major 
armed conflict which under any plausible definition, was a war.  As a judge and strong 
advocate of fidelity to the Constitution, Greene clearly did not want to evade his 
obligations to enforce what he viewed as a clear constitutional provision.  “What I am 
interested in finding out,” Greene calmly asked the Justice Department attorney arguing 
the case, “is whether a clause in the Constitution, not some blank space in the 
Constitution or some interpretation but an actual clause in the Constitution, can be 
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enforced, or is it simply up to the President either to ignore it or abide by it?”248  Greene 
seemed unsatisfied by the answer he got.
Despite Judge Greene’s apparent view that the executive position was inconsistent 
with the Constitution’s command, the practical, political and constitutional realities must 
have pressed on him.  The case was argued against a backdrop of a deeply divided 
Congress and nation where neither the congressional Democratic leadership nor the 
President was willing to call a special session to vote on authorization for war.  The U.N. 
Security Council had voted 12-2, with China abstaining, to authorize the United States 
and its allies to use “all necessary means,” a euphemism for force, to expel Iraq from 
Kuwait.249  Less than a week before the argument, President Bush dropped a diplomatic 
bombshell.  At a news conference, Bush announced that he had invited Iraq’s foreign 
minister to Washington, and offered to send Secretary of State Baker to Baghdad “to 
reach a peaceful solution” to the Persian Gulf crisis.250  While Congressman Dellums and 
other observers saw the diplomatic maneuverings as mostly show, nonetheless, a judge 
would be reluctant to issue an injunction while diplomatic efforts were under way.  What 
if a court’s injunction stiffened Hussein’s resolve and led to the breakdown of 
negotiations?  Any judge deciding the case would shoulder a heavy burden.
248Dellums v. Bush, Transcript of Hearing Before the Honorable Harold H. 
Greene, United States District Judge, Dec. 4, 1990, at 14.  Portions of the Transcript are 
also reprinted in FOREIGN RELATIONS AND NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 667-73 (Thomas M. 
Franck & Michael J. Glennon eds., 2d ed. 1993).
249U.N.S.C. Res. 678, U.N.S.C.O.R., 45th Sess., 296 3d Mtg., U.N. Doc. 
.S/RES/678 (1990).
250The MacNeil/Lehrer News Hour, Nov. 30, 1990, Transcript #3914 (LEXIS).
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Moreover, Judge Greene must have felt some conflict as to the underlying 
substantive policy to be followed toward Iraq.  For Greene, while liberal in domestic 
affairs, was, according to a former clerk who knew him well, an admirer of former 
Senator Henry “Scoop” Jackson’s hawkish views on foreign policy.
Most important was the reality that judges have been virtually unanimous in 
refusing to interfere with the U.S. military operations.  At oral argument, Judge Greene 
demonstrated an awareness of that reality when he asked whether any court at any point 
in American history had ever enjoined United States military action.251  The answer is no, 
with one exception; that of Judge Judd who enjoined the U.S. bombing of Cambodia in 
1973.252  His injunction was stayed within hours by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, 
which eventually reversed his decision a few months later.253
A similar decision by Judge Greene in the Dellums case would undoubtedly have 
suffered the same fate.  Moreover Judge Greene could have worried about its effect on 
the ongoing drama then unfolding in the Middle East.
Greene came up with a creative solution.  His decision, announced a month before 
the deadline set by the U.N. for Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait, rejected the government’s 
constitutional arguments and most of its jurisdictional and prudential arguments.
Greene decisively rejected the Justice Department’s political question defense, 
stating:
251Transcript, supra note 248, at 5.
252Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 361 F. Supp. 553 (E.D.N.Y. 1973), rev’d, 484 F.2d 
1307 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1974).
253484 F.2d 1307 (2d Cir. 1973).
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If the Executive had the sole power to determine that any particular 
offensive military operation, no matter how vast, does not constitute “war-
making” but only an “offensive military attack,” the congressional power 
to declare war will be at the mercy of a semantic decision by the 
Executive.  Such an interpretation would evade the plain language of the 
Constitution, and it cannot stand.254
Greene held that a U.S. assault on Iraq would be war, within the meaning of Article I, 
Section 8, Clause 11, and announced that “the court is not prepared to read out of the 
Constitution the clause granting to the Congress, and to it alone, the authority to declare 
war.”255  He went on to hold that the plaintiffs had standing, that the court had the 
equitable power to grant relief and concluded that, in principle, a court could issue an 
injunction at the request of members of Congress to prevent the conduct of a war that was 
about to be launched without congressional authorization.
Nonetheless, Greene concluded that the plaintiffs were not entitled to injunctive 
relief because the controversy was not ripe.  Greene held that the President was not so 
clearly committed to military action against Iraq to make the case ripe for injunctive 
relief.  More important, Greene said that the judicial branch should not decide issues 
affecting the allocation of power between the President and Congress if only a minority 
of Congress seeks relief.  Only where a majority of Congress has disapproved a 
president’s claim to use force does a ripe controversy exist, for only then, Greene held, 
254Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141 (D.D.C. 1990).
255Dellums, 752 F. Supp. at 1146.
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are the President and Congress locked in such deadlocked conflict that a court should 
intervene.
Greene did not dismiss the case; he only denied plaintiffs’ motion for a 
preliminary injunction.  He seemed to invite congressional action disapproving Bush’s 
move to war and stated that, should Congress take such action, plaintiffs could come back 
to court.
Both sides claimed victory:  on Nightline, Dellums praised Judge Greene’s 
rejection of the Justice Department’s sweeping war powers claims.256  The government 
correctly pointed out that technically Greene’s decision imposed no limit on the 
President’s prerogatives.  “The bottom line,” said the Justice Department attorney Stuart 
Gerson, “is we won.”257
The academic community reacted positively to Greene’s decision.  Harold Koh, 
the author of a brief filed on plaintiffs’ behalf by a group of prominent law professors, 
termed the decision an unappealable declaratory judgment against the government.258
John Hart Ely, a signer of that brief, wrote an essay entitled “Two Cheers For Judge 
Greene.”259
256Nightline, Persian Gulf Peace/War See-Saw, Dec. 14, 1990, at 13.  For other 
news commentary on Greene’s rejection of the Justice Department’s war powers claims, 
see Ethan Bronner, Judge Turns Back Bid to Force Bush to Consult Congress before 
Attack, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 14, 1990, at 17; David G. Savage & Michael Ross, U.S. 
Judge Refuses to Block Bush from Starting a War, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1990, § A, at 22.
257Harry Stoffer, Judge Finds Bush Can’t Go to War Alone, PITT. POST-GAZETTE, 
Dec. 14, 1990, at 3.
258Harold Hongju Koh, Comment, The Coase Theorem and the War Power:  A 
Response, 1991 DUKE L.J. 122, 123.
259John Hart Ely, Two Cheers For Judge Greene, 8 CONST. COMMENTARY 1 
(1991).
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The media could not declare a clear winner to the Dellums case, juxtaposing 
headlines like “Judge Finds Bush Can’t Go to War Alone” with subtitles, in smaller type, 
reading “But Says It’s Premature to Order President to Get Congressional OK.”260  The 
Los Angeles Times reversed the captions, starting with “U.S. Judge Refuses to Block 
Bush From Starting a War” and then adding “But He Also Says Only Congress Can 
Authorize an Attack on Iraq.”261  The N.Y. Times noted that, while Greene had rejected 
the legislators’ request for an injunction, “his ruling was also a significant rejection of the 
Bush Administration’s position that it need do nothing more than consult with Congress 
before going to war.”262
For Ron Dellums, however, the lawsuit was a clear success.  He focused on the 
political climate the case had helped create.  “I’m convinced that the main reason Bush 
eventually came to Congress was because of our lawsuit,” Dellums emphatically told me.  
“The lawsuit brought our struggle front and center, brought the Constitution front and 
center, and brought the Persian Gulf buildup front and center.”  Judge Greene’s holding 
that “the Court is not prepared to read Congress’ war powers out of the Constitution” 
gave us momentum to force Bush to come to Congress.  “Everyone felt buoyed by the 
decision.”  The congressman’s aide Lee Halterman felt that a “sea change” took place in 
Congress after Greene’s opinion was announced.  While Dellums had not stopped the 
war, Bush was forced to come to Congress, and Congress debated and voted on whether 
260Stoffer, supra note 257.
261Savage & Ross, supra note 256, at 1.
262Neil A. Lewis, Lawmakers Lose a Suit on War Powers, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 
1990, § A, at 15.
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to go to war.  “For me that was a victory,” Dellums claims.263  Our purpose in bringing 
the lawsuit had been, in large part, to spur political action.  From that perspective, Judge 
Greene had written a masterful decision, probably the best he could have rendered.
Greene had told the president that he couldn’t go to war alone.  But his decision 
also took Congress to task for avoiding its responsibility and for contributing to the 
constitutional crisis through its refusal to vote on Bush’s war.  In effect, Greene was 
telling Congress to show some backbone of its own if it wanted him to enjoin the 
president.  The whole decision put political and legal heat on both Congress and the 
president to act, and the fact that Greene had not dismissed our case meant that, if 
Congress did show some courage and voted to stop Bush, we could be back in court.  
Dellums decided not to appeal Greene’s decision.
Yet I remain troubled and conflicted by Greene’s approach.  Certainly Judge 
Greene’s approach was preferable to that of the other District Court Judge who heard a 
solider’s objection to the pending Persian Gulf War at the same time and who broadly 
dismissed his claim as presenting a non-justiciable political question.264  Moreover, had 
Judge Greene enjoined the President from going to war without congressional 
authorization, his decision would have certainly been appealed and undoubtedly reversed.  
But might that have been preferable.  Such an injunction certainly would have raised the 
constitutional issue to the foreground of the public debate, and in a manner where the 
meaning of the Executive’s constitutional violation was clearer.  It would have placed the 
court’s money where its mouth was:  the court’s commitment to its constitutional ruling 
263All the foregoing quotes are from Dellums Interview, supra note 247.
264Ange v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 509 (D.D.C. 1990).
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would have been clear.  Perhaps the best answer is that the acceptability of Greene’s 
approach is dependent on the factual circumstances confronting the court.  Given the 
circumstances Greene faced, in hindsight I cannot say he reached a bad result.
Greene’s approach in Dellums has a long pedigree in American history.  Certainly 
the most famous and celebrated use of this general technique was Chief Justice 
Marshall’s opinion in Marbury v. Madison where he first held that the Jefferson 
Administration had unconstitutionally deprived Marbury of his judicial commission and 
that the court could remedy that violation by issuing a mandamus against high Executive 
officials.  Only then did the court determine that it was without the jurisdiction to do so 
because the statute providing such jurisdiction was unconstitutional.  Jefferson firmly 
believed that the court’s discussion of Marbury’s right to a commission and the propriety 
of a court-issued mandamus against cabinet officials was “obiter dissertation,”265 and it 
was this part of the opinion that aroused the greatest attack by Republicans.266  Indeed, it 
was Marshall’s dicta condemning the President’s actions, and not his assertion of the 
principle of judicial review of legislative acts that received most of the press attention at 
the time.267  Marshall certainly intended to send the message that the President was acting 
unlawfully, at the very time he was avoiding a direct confrontation with the political 
branches.  His opinion has aptly been termed, “a masterwork of indirection, a brilliant 
example of Marshall’s capacity to sidestep danger while seeming to court it, to advance 
265Letter of Thomas Jefferson to William Jarvis, Sept. 28, 1820 in 12 THE 
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON ___ (Andrew A. Lipscombe ed., 1903).
266I CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 244 
(1924).
267Representative was the New York Evening Post’s Editorial headed 
“Constitution violated by President.”  Id. at 247; see generally id. at 247-55.
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in one direction while his opponents are looking in another.”268  Like Greene’s opinion, 
Marshall’s tactical brilliance in Marbury lay at least in part in his taking advantage of the 
always potential tension between the court’s role in creating meaning and its function of 
exercising power.269
Examples of similar judicial strategies of creating meaning while declining to 
exercise judicial power appear in other cases.  While the initial Vietnam War cases 
simply dismissed soldier or citizen complaints as posing broad political questions or on 
other jurisdictional grounds, as the war dragged on, a few courts, such as the D.C. 
Circuit, spoke out clearly against the constitutionality of the war, while still dismissing 
the lawsuit.  In Mitchell v. Laird, the respected jurists Judge Wyzanski and Chief Judge 
Bazelon held the Vietnam War unconstitutional, despite congressional funding for the 
war, writing “this court cannot be unmindful of what every schoolboy knows:  that in 
voting to appropriate money or to draft men a congressman is not necessarily approving 
of the continuation of a war no matter how specifically that appropriation or draft act 
refers to that war.”270  The court nonetheless refused to enjoin the continuing war, 
holding that the question of whether President Nixon was proceeding in good faith to 
promptly end that unconstitutional war was a non-justiciable political question.  The 
268ROBERT MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 40 (1960).
269Marshall’s opinion is different from Greene’s in that by denying jurisdiction he 
cleverly asserted the enormous power to hold congressional statutes unconstitutional.  
But what if Marshall had simply resorted to a less powerful device to deny jurisdiction, 
such as a technical reading of the Judiciary Act so as not to provide the Court with 
original mandamus jurisdiction over Marbury’s claim.  Marshall’s decision, which was 
dicta, that the President had acted unconstitutionally and a court could order Madison to 
appoint Marbury would have still been an important decision in American constitutional 
law.
270Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611, 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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court’s statement of what “every schoolboy knows,” was shortly thereafter written into 
the War Powers Resolution, when Congress enacted that law over President Nixon’s veto 
later in 1973.271
Courts have at times introduced changes in legal doctrines by articulating legal 
limitations without granting the relief sought by the particular party before the court.272
Similarly, the Supreme Court has in a variety of different contexts recognized the validity 
and necessity of ignoring the general rule that a court should avoid deciding difficult 
constitutional questions when the decision can rest on alternative grounds and instead 
encouraged lower courts to decide a constitutional issue that may even be irrelevant to the 
disposition of a case in order to instruct the citizenry and public officials as to the 
Constitution’s meaning.273  Another situation that contains traces of the same approach is 
what my colleague Arthur Hellman terms oppositive dictum, where a court denies relief, 
271War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. 1547 (2002).
272See, e.g., Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967) (establishing rule that 
unfairness of lineup can lead to due process violation, but refusing to apply the rule in 
that case.  Some of the courts that created exceptions to the common law employment at 
will doctrine did so by recognizing the existence of a public policy exception but 
construing it narrowly to deny relief to the party before the court.  See Larsen v. Motor 
Supply Co., 177 Ariz. 507, 573 P.2d 907 (Ct. App. 1977); Geary v. United States Steel 
Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 319 A.2d 174 (1974); Roberts v. Atlantic Richfied Co., 88 Wash. 
887, 568 P.2d 764 (1977).
273See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (Fourth Amendment claim can 
be adjudicated even though good faith exception may be dispositive of the suppression 
issue); Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1970) (whether Constitution requires 
assistance of counsel at preliminary hearing can be litigated even though no relief may be 
available); Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201-02 (2001) (court should determine whether 
a constitutional right has been violated even if it then determines that defendant has 
qualified immunity).
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but states that in a different set of circumstances it might or would reach a different 
result.274
There are a myriad of mechanisms that a court can use to indicate support for a 
legal norm to the broader legal and political community, yet refuse to enforce such a rule.  
One historical example is the Ohio Supreme Court’s refusal to rule on Salmon Chase’s 
broad constitutional claim that a slave became free the moment her master brought her to 
Ohio, yet its signaling its agreement with his argument by having it printed and widely 
publicized.275  The court’s decisions in Brown v. Bd. of Education contain aspects of the 
same dichotomy between norm articulation and norm enforcement, in its strong and 
unanimous rejection of segregation as a constitutional norm yet refusal to order any relief 
for the Black plaintiffs except its later dictate that the southern states should adopt 
desegregation plans with “all deliberate speed,” which turned out to be an illusory effort 
to avoid using the full force of the court’s coercive power to compel compliance.  
Supreme Court decisions since Brown have sometimes “attached as much significance, or 
more, to the symbolism of laws as to their more tangible or material consequences.”276
The fundamental problem with this general rubric is its separation between legal 
meaning and the commitment to live by and enforce that meaning.  As Robert Cover 
pointed out, law cannot exist apart from both a legal narrative and a commitment to that 
274Arthur D. Hellman, Breaking the Banc:  The Common-Law Process in the 
Large Appellate Court, 23 ARIZ. STATE L.J. 915, 927-28 (1991); Arthur D. Hellman, 
Jumboism and Jurisprudence:  The Theory and Practice of Precedent in the Large 
Appellate Court, 56 CHI. L. REV. 541, 558-60 (1989).
275James G. Birney v. The State of Ohio, 8 OHIO REPORTS 230, 231 (1837); HART, 
supra note 71, at 74 and SHUCKERS, supra note 83, at 43-44.
276Steven D. Smith, Book Review, Rethinking Abortion:  Equal Choice, The 
Constitution and Reproductive Politics, 13 CONST. COMMENTARY 357, 370 (1996).
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law.277  To Lon Fuller, unenforced norms strain the concept of “rule of law,” because 
“congruence between official action and declared rule” is an essential part of “the internal 
morality” of law.278  Similarly Professor Tribe argues that the articulation of norms for 
symbolic purposes that are not enforced breeds a hypocrisy and cynicism that undermines 
the rule of law in the Anglo-American tradition.279  Professor Fiss rejected an approach 
that would resolve the core dilemma in structural reform litigation by confining the judge 
to the declaration of rights and not their enforcement because it “would require a 
detachment or an indifference to this world.”280  Less philosophically and more 
doctrinally, the law pronouncement approach is in tension with Article III courts rejection 
of advisory opinions and their avoidance of deciding difficult constitutional issues unless 
absolutely necessary.281
The answer to the doctrinal problem is fairly straightforward.  The advisory 
opinion doctrine prevents a court from adjudicating hypothetical or moot issues or 
controversies between adverse parties not before the court.282  It does not prevent the 
277Robert Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983).
278LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 81 (Yale U. Press rev. ed., 1969).
279TRIBE, supra note 235.
280Fiss, supra note 3, at 57-58.
281See Zadyydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 689 (2001) (It is a “cardinal principle” of 
statutory interpretation . . . that when an Act of Congress raises a ‘serious doubt’ as to its 
constitutionality, “this court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is 
fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.”); Public Citizen v. United States 
Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 466 (1989); Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 
297 U.S. 288, 341 (Brandeis, concurring).
282See Princeton University v. Schmid, 455 U.S. 100 (1982); Muskrat v. United 
States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911); see also 3 CORRESPONDENCE AND PUBLIC PAPERS OF JOHN 
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court from articulating the law governing an issue, nor from deciding an issue in 
plaintiff’s favor yet denying relief on other grounds.  The rule does not mandate any 
particular order of deciding issues, it merely requires that the issues be presented by 
adverse parties alleging an actual dispute.283
Nor does the principle, developed in the context of statutory interpretation, of not 
deciding difficult constitutional questions unless it is necessary to do so, preclude the 
articulation of principle approach suggested here.  The Supreme Court has recognized in 
a number of areas the propriety of addressing an important constitutional question before 
turning to another, potentially dispositive issue.284  The value of avoiding difficult 
constitutional questions is not absolute and must be balanced against the competing value 
of providing guidance to the other branches of government.  For example, in its decision 
to create a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule, the court held that “[t]here is no 
need for courts to adopt the inflexible practice of always deciding whether the officers’ 
conduct manifested objective good faith before turning to the question whether the Fourth 
Amendment has been violated.”285  Noting that “courts have considerable discretion in 
conforming their decision-making processes to the exigencies of particular cases,” the 
Court stated that “[i]f the resolution of a particular Fourth Amendment question is 
JAY 486-89 (H. Johnston ed., 1981) (setting forth Jay’s view of the advisory opinion 
doctrine).
283United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 924-25 (1984).
284Id. at 3422-23 (1984) (fourth amendment claim can be adjudicated even though 
good faith exception may be dispositive of the suppression issue); Saucier v. Katz, 533 
U.S. 194, 201 (2001) (qualified immunity requires first a determination of whether a 
constitutional right was violated, before turning to the issue of whether the right is clearly 
established in order to protect the process of the law’s elaboration).
285United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. at 924.
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necessary to guide future action by law enforcement officers and magistrates, nothing 
will prevent reviewing courts from deciding that question before turning to the good faith 
issue.286
The more troubling problem is therefore the objection that by articulating a rule 
without enforcing it in the particular case, the court states “no more than the proclamation 
of an admittedly unworkable moral idea.”287  Professor Scharpf’s criticism of Bickel 
captures the essence of the quandary inhering in the Court’s lack of commitment to the 
principle it articulates:
What would be the persuasiveness of an interpretation of the Constitution 
which the interpreter himself could not wish to see put into practice?  
From what revelation should the Court derive authority to proclaim moral 
postulates—or have its judgments any legitimacy beyond that of an 
intellectual honesty disciplined by its responsibility for the disposition of 
the concrete case?
It would sacrifice that realism of constitutional interpretation which is the 
necessary condition of its effectiveness.  Interpretation which would no 
longer be answerable to the real conditions and exigencies of community 
life would transform constitutional law into a collection of programmatic 
postulates to be worshiped on the Fourth of July; and the easier it would 
be for the Court to retreat from conflicts in the real world into the ideal 
realm of pure principle, the less ready and able would it be to protect the 
community against transgression of its fundamental code.288
286Id.
287Fritz W. Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political Question:  A Functional 
Analysis, 75 YALE L.J. 517, 565 (1966).
288Id.
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It may well be that the enunciation of a principle without a commitment to 
enforce it would have the effect that Scharpf describes and cannot be considered law but 
mere rhetoric.  But a judge’s commitment to a principle he or she articulates cannot be 
measured in pure all or nothing terms—as Scharpf suggests.  Rather judicial commitment 
comes in all shades and hues, just as the community’s commitment to its narratives of 
law can take many forms.
As Robert Cover points out in Norms and Narrative, there is a difference between 
the commitment demonstrated by a community that “writes law review articles”—forcing 
the officialdom to maintain its interpretation “merely by suffering the protest of the 
articles,” and a community that disobeys the criminal law, forcing judges to affirm the 
official interpretation of law only by committing violence against the protestor.289  To 
Cover, however, both communities demonstrate a commitment to create and maintain 
law.  We certainly cheer more loudly for the civil resister; law review authors win no 
Noble prizes.  One clearly has a stronger commitment than the other, but neither is 
merely dishonestly evoking an unworkable moral ideal.  The soldier who retreats in the 
face of a massive and uncontainable enemy assault in order to take up a more defensible 
position from which to fight may have no less a commitment to his nation’s cause than 
the soldier who stands fast and dies.  So too, judicial commitment to constitutional liberty 
and justice takes many forms, and cannot be measured simply by the heroic judge who 
affirms justice at the peril of his office, his legitimacy, or his life.  Certainly history’s 
verdict is conclusive that Chief Justice Marshall’s dicta in Marbury that high Executive 
officials are not above the law has certainly been accorded as much legitimacy as if 
289Cover, supra note 277, at 47-48.
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Marshall had ordered Marbury appointed—certainly if the result of that decision would 
have been that Jefferson refused and the Supreme Court’s authority decisively weakened.  
Judge Greene, while refusing to enforce the clear constitutional command that Congress 
authorize war (in my opinion wrongly), nonetheless kept jurisdiction over Dellums claim 
and suggested that given the right circumstances in the future, he would (or more aptly 
might) enforce the law.  Had a majority of Congress voted down the authorization for war 
when the President finally placed the issue before them in early January 1991, and had 
President Bush nonetheless proceeded to initiate war as he later indicated he would have 
done,290 Greene might have enforced Article I had a soldier or representative of Congress 
so requested.  What Judge Greene would have done in that not purely hypothetical 
scenario291 is conjecture—quite possibly he would have found yet another way to avoid 
issuing an injunction.  But certainly his opinion left open that possibility, and was not 
purely abstract moralizing.  It is not hard to see why, when another congressional war 
powers challenge to Executive war making was made some years later, the plaintiffs 
again sought to draw Judge Greene, despite his refusal to grant relief in the Dellums case.
The question of whether those who act as Judge Greene did are affirming or 
avoiding their constitutional responsibilities, must, in the final analysis, be determined on 
a case-by-case basis given the context and circumstances of each case and an analysis of 
290President Bush continued to maintain that congressional approval was 
unnecessary and was committed to war even if Congress voted against him.  (As he later 
explained, “I wasn’t going to let some old goats in Congress tell me whether I could kick 
Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait.”)  Remarks of President George Bush before the Texas 
State Republican Convention in Dallas, Texas.  Federal News Service, June 20, 1992, at 
3.
291On January 11, the Senate narrowly approved uathorization by a 52-47 margin, 
the House by a much wider margin.
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the Court’s specific decision.  My point here is not to fashion a sweeping proposition 
either affirming or denying the validity of such judicial action.  Rather it is that 
particularly in cases where the litigation functions in whole or part as a forum for public 
debate, judges should consider it as an option.  That is especially true if the judge is 
disposed to permit an injustice to continue because of her reading of formal law or of the 
practical necessities of the situation.  In some cases, a judge’s resort to this option may 
have the effect that Scharpf describes and make judges less ready and able to protect the 
community against transgressions of its fundamental code.  In others, it might help spur 
the political movement in ways that may be more important than obtaining judicial relief.  
How judges craft their opinion can help or harm the political or social movement of 
which the plaintiff is but a representative.  Congressman Dellums certainly felt that Judge 
Greene helped his.
Robert Cover ended his book Justice Accused with an insight about judges that, 
“If a man makes a good priest, we may be quite sure he will not be a great prophet.”292
That insight sounds right, but it may also be true that a good priest may be able to aid, 
instead of obstruct those that are prophets.  Judges are seldom great prophets, but the best 
can prove very valuable and helpful to a prophetic or redemptive constitutional 
movement that has as its primary arena not the courtroom, but the streets.
V. The Role of Lawyers in the Public Forum Model
That litigation can often have as a primary or significant purpose or effect 
political mobilization and education outside the courtroom yields important insights for 
lawyers as well as judges.  This model of litigation radically redefines the role of a 
292COVER, supra note 75, at 259.
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lawyer.  The lawyer in presenting his or her case does not act as the neutral detached 
advocate posited by the traditional model, nor even the less detached, elite, sympathetic 
and empathetic legal expert of the law reform model.  Rather, the lawyer ought to be not 
simply for the movement, but in and of the political or social movement he or she 
represents; “a lawyer can join the client as a comrade and serve as a legal advisor.”293
Activist attorneys often use the term “movement lawyer” to express what they do and 
how they view their role.  For example, prominent socialist, labor activist attorney 
Staughton Lynd derived his legal role from the notion of “accompaniment” used by 
liberation theologians in Latin America.  This meant a duty to accompany workers in 
their struggle for justice, to help them articulate their interests and express their anger, 
and to present their vision of a more just and ultimately socialistic society.294  Many 
lawyers who bring litigation for broader political purposes straddle the line between 
lawyer and political activist, as did Salmon Chase, Staughton Lynd, or well-known civil 
rights lawyer Arthur Kinoy.
This conception of a lawyer’s role leads to somewhat different legal 
decisionmaking and strategies from that posited by either the traditional dispute 
resolution or institutional litigation models.  First, the decision as to whether to bring a 
case, make an argument, or raise a claim cannot be based solely, or at times even 
primarily on an analysis of the legal merits.  As Professor Arthur Kinoy, a leading civil 
293David Luban, Conscientious Lawyers for Conscientious Lawbreakers, 52 U. 
PITT. L. REV. 793, 800 (1991).
294JULES LOBEL, SUCCESS WITHOUT VICTORY: LOST LEGAL BATTLES AND THE 
LONG ROAD TO JUSTICE IN AMERICA 127 (2003).
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rights litigator of the 1950s, 60s and 70s explained in his autobiographical book, Rights 
on Trial
the test of success for a people’s lawyer is not always the technical 
winning or losing of the formal proceeding.  Again and again, the real test 
was the impact of the legal activities on the morale and understanding of 
the people involved in the struggle.  To the degree that the legal work 
helped to develop a sense of strength, an ability to fight back, it was 
successful.  This could even be achieved without reaching the objective of 
formal victory. . . .295
Thus, for Kinoy, the decision whether to bring a lawsuit could not be based solely 
on “the likelihood of success within the court structure.”296  Rather, the question was 
what role the lawsuit would play in the people’s struggle.  “If it helped the fight, then it 
was done, even if the chances of immediate legal success were virtually nonexistent.”297
This approach requires such movement lawyers to take risks in bringing cases that 
present difficult, uphill battles and could create bad precedents.  For many traditional law 
reform litigators, such as former NAACP Legal Defense Fund general counsel Jack 
Greenberg, test cases generally “should not be brought if they are likely to be lost.”298  To 
be sure, the likely legal success of a case should be carefully considered before it is 
295KINOY, supra note 22, at 57-58.
296Id. at 71.
297Id.
298Jack Greenberg, Litigation for Social Change:  Methods, Limits and Roles in 
Democracy, in 29 RECORD OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK
320, 349 (1974).
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brought, and the risk of precedent should be weighed, but under the public protest model 
of reform litigation that cannot be the sole or, at times even the primary consideration.  
For example, in Danville, South Carolina, Kinoy and William Kunstler, another 
prominent civil rights attorney, pioneered the use of the long-dormant federal removal 
statute to prevent state prosecutions of civil rights activists.  Jack Greenberg, then the 
legal director of the NAACP Inc. Fund, completely rejected the idea of using this old 
Reconstruction-era statute to stop the state court trials of the demonstrators, calling it a 
crazy idea amounting to “playing with the courts.”299  But, despite the reservations of 
many of the lawyers, and the lack of legal precedent, Kinoy and Kunstler decided to try, 
for there were no other good alternatives and the civil rights movement was pressing for 
some legal action.  Miraculously, Kinoy and the other Danville lawyers temporarily won 
an injunction in the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.300
Similarly, when the first Holocaust restitution lawsuit was filed in October 1996 
against the Swiss banks, most legal observers viewed the suit as a “sure loser.”301  Yet the 
suit obviously had a political motive to create public embarrassment and put political 
pressure on the Swiss banks by exposing their role in the Holocaust.  The suit, a “legal 
loser,” succeeded in that aim.  Less than two years later, the Swiss banks were willing to 
pay $1.25 billion to end the litigation.302
299 Id. at 193.
300Id. at 193-208.
301Michael J. Bazyler, The Holocaust Restriction Movement in Comparative 
Perspective, 20 BERKELEY J. INT’L LAW 11, 36 (2002).
302Id.  Bazyler also observes that in December 1999, Germany and its industry 
agreed to pay DM 10 billion ($4.8 billion) to settle Holocaust slave labor claims, just 
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Most cases brought in the face of unfavorable precedent undoubtedly lose in 
court.  They therefore may create bad precedent, although in most instances they simply 
pile more bad precedent on an already poor situation.  Some cases do contain a silver 
lining when the judges draft their opinions in a manner to create room for the law to grow 
and develop despite the defeat in court.303  But generally, while the risk of creating bad 
precedent ought clearly to be weighed before litigation is commenced, lawyers ought not 
to allow a fear of losing to paralyze their work, stifle creativity or make them overly 
cautious.  The courts as forums for protest therefore balances the risk of creating bad 
precedent against the other, more political aims of the lawsuit differently than either of 
the other models, with a recognition that the aim of litigation at times extends beyond 
winning or losing in court.
Another critical lesson posed by the courts as forums of protests is that public 
interest lawyers must draft their complaints and argue their cases before the courts based 
not simply or at times primarily on the technical, sound legal arguments, but on the broad 
moral/political themes that will resonate with their clients, the political movement they 
represent, the general public, and often judges.  Salmon Chase and the other anti-slavery 
lawyers understood this when they framed their legal arguments as broad moral and 
constitutional broadsides against slavery.  These arguments might not and in fact did not 
convince a court, but were very effective anti-slavery arguments because they 
months after two New Jersey federal courts ruled that German companies had immunity 
from the slave labor litigation.  Id.
303Often the dialectical process by which the common law and constitutional law 
changes starts with failed efforts to change the law, followed by a series of cases that 
distinguish the first cases or create exceptions that eventually lead to a change in the rule.
EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 1-19 (1949).
-108-
emphasized both the immorality of slavery and the absolute incongruity of democracy 
and slavery.304
The Shelley v. Kraemer case presents another example of a lawyer making a 
broad moral/political argument which might make an impression on a judge, but will 
more likely resonate in the public debate. George Vaughn, a municipal court lawyer in 
St. Louis who had brought the Shelley case to the Supreme Court despite Thurgood 
Marshall’s objections that the time was not right for Supreme Court review of the issue 
argued the restrictive covenant cases along with Marshall.305  Philip Elman, an attorney in 
the Solicitor General’s office who helped draft the government’s brief in Shelley and 
attended the oral arguments recounts Vaughn’s argument:
[H]e made an argument that as a professional piece of advocacy was not 
particularly distinguished.  You might even say it was poor.  He mainly 
argued the thirteenth amendment, which wasn’t before the Court.  He tried 
to distinguish cases when it was clear that the cases were indistinguishable 
and the only way to deal with them was to ignore or overrule them.  It was 
a dull argument until he came to the very end.  He concluded his argument 
by saying . . . “Now I’ve finished my legal argument, but I want to say this 
before I sit down.  In this Court, this house of law, the Negro today stands 
outside, and he knocks on the door, over and over again, he knocks on the 
door and cries out, ‘Let me in, let me in, for I too have helped build this 
house.’”
304HART, supra note 71, at 72-73.
305See William Rubenstein, Divided We Litigate:  Addressing Disputes Among 
Group Members and Lawyers in Civil Rights Campaigns, 106 YALE L.J. 1623, 1627-33 
(1997).  As Rubenstein notes, several cases were consolidated for review in the Supreme 
Court.
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All of a sudden there was drama in the courtroom, a sense of what the case 
was really all about rather than the technical legal arguments. . . .  [It was] 
the most moving plea in the Court I’ve ever heard.306
Vaughn was so inspiring that he was invited to repeat his speech at the 1948 Democratic 
National Convention.307
The examples of George Vaughn making broad emotional/political arguments and 
poorly arguing or ignoring the technical legal distinctions that are the daily grist of an 
appellate lawyers’ life are extreme.  In many cases, it is precisely the broad 
moral/political/legal arguments that place more technical, legal points in their proper 
context, and if made properly can influence both the judges hearing the case and the 
broad public to whom the lawyer seeks to appeal.  Many more polished and experienced 
oral advocates than Vaughn have recognized that to strike a chord with both the judges 
one needs to convince and the public one often has to cut through the technical legal 
underbrush with a broad plea to justice and morality.  For example, Harold Koh who 
argued the Haitian Refugee case before the Supreme Court started his argument with a 
broad plea about the injustice of the United States’ policy, hoping that his opening might 
convince the Court to view his technical arguments more favorably, but recognizing that 
even if it did not, it would appeal to his broader audience.308
306Philip Elman & Norman Silber, The Solicitor General’s Office, Justice 
Frankfurter and Civil Rights Litigation, 1946-1960:  An Oral History, 100 HARV. L. 
REV. 817, 819 (1987).
307Rubenstein, supra note 305, at 1630.
308See Kauffman & Gosselin, supra note 14.
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Public interest lawyers also have to look at the interaction between the litigation 
and broader interests of their clients and the movements they represent, not only in 
arguing their cases, but in drafting complaints.  Many lawyers feel constrained in drafting 
pleadings by their perception of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requirement of 
notice pleadings,309 the constraints of professional standards and the rules learned theory 
of their legal education.  They therefore draft complaints that lose the details, passion and 
identity of their clients, the “thickness” of her story and oppression.310  For example, in 
litigation filed recently challenging a particularly outrageous case of the Federal 
government’s anti-terrorism policy run amok, an experienced and excellent attorney cited 
the Federal Rules notice pleading requirement to request that the lawyers who had drafted 
the complaint cut out alot of the detail.  That detail had provided a rich and vivid account 
of the oppression the client had encountered.  While the complaint could undoubtedly 
have been improved through editing, it needed to tell the client’s full narrative, so that 
both the judge assigned to the case would comprehend its full outrage, but additionally so 
that the media, and the public will understand his dramatic and compelling story.311
The forum for protest model of courts therefore compels a lawyer to think not 
only of the technical arguments that will win in court, but what arguments will serve the 
movement he or she is working with.  The model is therefore much more receptive to 
transformative arguments that look beyond the winning or losing the particular legal 
309FED. R. CIV. P. 8.
310Herbert A. Eastman, Speaking Truth to Power:  The Language of Civil Rights 
Litigators, 104 YALE L.J. 763 (1995).
311Elman & Silber, supra note 306, at 771-72.
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battle and serve to transform political consciousness and reshape the way legal conflicts 
are represented in the law.312
While urging lawyers to pay attention to the broader political aims of their clients 
and political movements when they draft complaints and argue before courts may temper 
some of the limitations of law reform litigation articulated by the Critical Legal Studies 
Movement and other progressive scholars, it raises new contradictions.  Those new 
tensions are generated by what often is a conflict between broad political, moral or legal 
arguments and the often narrow terrain that courts and law forces lawyers to work in.  
That conflict envelops many law reform cases, particularly those in which the lawyers’ 
and litigants’ goals are broader than just winning in court.
For example, in 1984 the prominent human rights lawyer Michael Ratner brought 
a case on behalf of Congressman Michael Barnes and a number of other Democratic 
Congressmen challenging President Reagan’s pocket veto of legislation that would have 
required a certification that human rights were improving in El Salvador.313  His real 
interest, and the interest of many of the human rights groups and members of Congress 
supporting the lawsuit was to eventually stop the flow of U.S. aid to the Salvadoran 
government, whose human rights record was atrocious.  Nevertheless, the case, in which 
the entire House of Representatives and Senate eventually joined as plaintiffs only raised 
a narrow legal argument of whether the President had the constitutional power to pocket-
312Charles R. Lawrence III, Two Views of the River:  A Critique of the Liberal 
Defense of Affirmative Action, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 928, 965 (2001); Peter Gabel & Paul 
Harris, Building Power and Breaking Images:  Critical Legal Theory and the Practice of 
Law, 11 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 369 (1983).
313Barnes v. Carmen, 582 F. Supp. 163 (D.D.C. 1984), rev’d, Barnes v. Kline, 759 
F.2d 21 (D.C. Cir. 1985), vacate as moot, Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 361 (1987).
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veto legislation.  While that question was an important separation of powers issue, as the 
case dragged on through the lengthy appellate process, for Rather and many other human 
rights activists, the case lost much of its political meaning.  After the Court of Appeals 
decided in plaintiffs’ favor and the Supreme Court agreed to hear the case, Ratner 
decided not to argue it before the Court, deferring to his co-counsel.  While most 
litigators would jump at the chance to argue before the Supreme Court, to Ratner, “the 
idea that I would put aside weeks and months to brief and argue this highly technical case 
while I was at the height of my political organizing was absurd.”314  The Supreme Court 
eventually decided the case had become moot because the statutory period within which 
the certification would have been effective had elapsed.315
Ratner’s conflict was an extreme case of the reform lawyer’s dilemma.  The 
litigation forum often channels legal argument into forms that are likely to persuade a 
judge, but are not necessarily what the lawyers, litigants or political movements believe 
represent justice.  For example, Professor Charles Lawrence has discussed this dilemma 
in the context of whether and how to support the diversity defense of affirmative action 
when in the short run it is the course most like to succeed in the contemporary judicial 
climate yet it leaves unchallenged and indeed affirms a university’s role in perpetuating 
and entrenching a privileged elite.  For the lawyer using the courts as a forum to both 
protest and hopefully ultimately transform the social, political and economic injustices of 
our society the dilemma is particularly acute, for he or she, unlike the theorist must work 
daily in that arena.  For that lawyer, one question is how to introduce what Lawrence 
314Quoted in LOBEL, supra note 294, at 207.
315Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 361 (1987).
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terms “transformative arguments” into litigation, and use that litigation to thus inform the 
political dialogue.316  Generally, the institutional law reform model does not address this 
dilemma, because this problem focuses more on the relationship between lawyers and the 
political movements they work with and less on the role of the judge in a particular case.
For some constitutional theorists, the solution is to abandon the effort to articulate 
progressive, transformative or aspiration norms in the courts.317  Some civil rights 
litigators, however reject that approach and continue to view litigation not merely as a 
means to transform institutions, but as one forum among many to raise questions that 
may eventual transform contemporary, mainstream political dialogue.
This question was starkly presented in litigation challenging U.S. Steel’s plan 
closings in Youngstown, Ohio in the late 1970s.  An attorney in that case, Staughton 
Lynd, had articulated a promissory estoppel theory that he believed was supported by 
contract law.  U.S. Steel had made a promise to keep the Youngstown mills open if they 
could be made profitable.  The workers had agreed to a variety of concessions, worked 
hard, and relied on that promise to their detriment, yet U.S. Steel had breached its 
promise.  That theory in Lynd’s view, both articulated the worker’s feelings of injustice 
and posed a radical challenge to traditional management rights.
But the district court judge raised a much more radical theory that perhaps the 
Youngstown community had acquired some vested property rights in U.S. Steel “from 
the lengthy, long-established relationship between United States Steel, . . . the community 
316Lawrence, supra note 314, at 958-60.
317Kenneth L. Karst, The Coming Crisis of Work in Constitutional Perspective, 82 
CORNELL L. REV. 523, 529 (1997); Robin West, Is Progressive Constitutionalism 
Possible, 4 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 1 (1999); Robin West, Progressive and Conservative 
Constitutionalism, 88 MICH. L. REV. 641, 714-15 (1990).
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in Youngstown . . . in having given and devoted their lives to this industry.”318
Ultimately the judge had concluded that there was no legal precedent for such a property 
right, dismissed the “property right” claim and found that U.S. Steel had not breached 
any promise to keep the mills running.
The workers appealed and Lynd wrote a brief arguing for the worker’s contract 
claim.  But Lynd could not write a brief arguing for a community property right for 
which there was no precedent.  Lynd’s socialist politics led him to the belief that, while 
he could use the law to win concrete victories and raise issues, he also felt that the 
limitations of capitalist laws had to be recognized, understood, and explained.  While 
Lynd was perfectly willing to bring a “prophetic” case for which there was some legal 
precedent, even if for political reasons the case would likely lose, he was unwilling to 
argue a case with no supporting precedent.  The role of a radical labor lawyer, Lynd 
thought, is to articulate the workers’ feelings of injustice in a manner that the law could 
recognize.  If the law did not recognize the workers’ complaint as actionable, then the 
lawyer’s role was to tell the workers that and to develop another strategy for fighting the 
injustice.
But, though Lynd was unwilling to argue the community property right issue to 
the Court of Appeals, there was a respected national legal group and a prominent national 
lawyer willing to fill the void.  The Center for Constitutional Rights submitted an amicus 
brief, signed by Arthur Kinoy, a professor at Rutgers Law School, that argued for a 
community property right to prevent a company in U.S. Steel’s position from unilaterally 
deciding to close mills vital to that community.
318See STAUGHTON LYND, THE FIGHT AGAINST SHUTDOWNS 166 (1982).
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Kinoy’s approach to the dilemma presented by “transformative arguments” 
differed from Lynd’s.  Local unions were actively engaged in struggle, raising 
fundamental questions of whether the Constitution protected not merely civil and 
political rights but also economic rights.  Irrespective of whether legal precedent 
supported a community property right, Kinoy believed that people’s lawyers had to find 
and use whatever they could to argue that the Constitution supported such rights—a 
position that would help motivate workers across America to struggle against plant 
closing.  He hoped that the mass labor movement around plant closings would have the 
same impact as the civil rights movement had on the courts in the 1960s.
While Lynd’s approach recognizes the limits of law and using litigation both to 
advance particular struggle and to help explain, educate and expose the nature of 
capitalist law, for Kinoy, the law and the Constitution are fundamentally indeterminate 
vessels, with their meaning determined not by legal precedent but by the political struggle 
of masses of people.  Articulating radical rights such as economic and social rights both 
in the context of litigation as well as political forums can, for Kinoy, motivate thousands 
of people to struggle for those rights which in turn will impact upon the courts.  For 
Kinoy, the paradigm for this courts as forums for protest model was the mass, democratic 
civil rights struggle during the 1960s, during which period he articulated radical, 
transformative notions of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments which at times 
were accepted by the courts.319
The different approaches to law and constitutional rights taken by Kinoy and 
Lynd reflect longstanding tensions in the radical movement’s view of the Constitution 
319Kinoy, supra note 22; Arthur Kinoy, The Constitutional Right of Negro 
Freedom, 21 RUTGERS L. REV. 387, 426-27 (1967).
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and of litigation that commenced with the split within the abolitionist movement over 
whether the Constitution, properly interpreted, outlawed slavery.  Lynd sympathized with 
the abolitionists who had accurately viewed the Constitution as having accepted slavery 
and thus had called on anti-slavery judges to resign, as opposed to those abolitionists, 
such as Alvan Stewart, who had proposed radical reinterpretations of the Constitution 
based on theories of natural law and natural rights.  Kinoy’s view hued closer to that of 
Alvan Stewart and Senator Charles Summer who argued in court and elsewhere that the 
Constitution should always be interpreted in favor of liberty, equality, and human rights.
My intellectual predilection lies more with Lynd’s approach, which captures 
critical theory’s emphasis on exposing the contradictions and limitations of law.  
However, Kinoy was able to use his approach in the 1960s to help use litigation to 
mobilize thousands of civil rights activists and law students to engage in potentially 
transformative litigation.  What this suggests is that solutions to the dilemma must come 
in a case by case contextual context, and that in some eras and cases Kinoy’s approach 
may have the invaluable effect he sought.  It didn’t in the plant closing case.  Perhaps the 
Courts as Forums for Protest model main contribution is simply to articulate it and the 
dilemma of attempting to make transformative arguments in the context of litigation, 
force litigators to attempt to grapple with it and not ignore the problem.
Finally, lawyers who undertake this type of litigation must be both willing to 
support their clients’ political actions and mount public educational campaigns that 
dovetail and interface with the litigation.320  Yet often clients’ political actions cause 
320GERALD LOPEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERS:  ONE CHICANO’S VISION OF 
PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE 3 (1992) (decrying activist lawyers who never thought of 
mounting public educational campaigns).
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problems with a law reformer’s carefully calibrated legal/political strategy.  For example, 
in the Haiti refugee litigation, the Haitians’ hunger strike pushed the popular mobilization 
beyond the “legal team’s grand plan.”321  While the strike led to a very successful 
organizing effort and educational effort around the case, but caused division amongst the 
legal team as to whether the strike and resulting publicity was helpful or harmful.
I conclude with a discussion of the litigation brought on behalf of the prisoners 
being held by the United States at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.  This important litigation fits 
comfortably within the Courts as forums for protests model, and illustrates many of the 
insights and contradictions of the model.
In early 2002, the Center for Constitutional Rights challenged the Bush 
Administration’s detention of suspected Taliban and Al Qaeda prisoners at Guantanamo 
Bay without affording them the protections or rights due under the Geneva Convention.  
At the time, many individuals and organizations were timid about openly challenging the 
Administration’s anti-terrorism policies.  Moreover, a case on behalf of the Guantanamo 
detainees presented a particularly difficult context within to challenge the Administration.  
These prisoners had been captured in and around Afghanistan as part of a popular war 
effort.  The memory of September 11 was fresh on people’s minds.  The government 
claimed that what they were doing at Guantanamo was necessary to defend American 
national security and prevent future terrorist attacks, a claim that resonates particularly 
strongly with courts.  Most important, Johnson v. Eisentragger322 decided by the 
Supreme Court in 1950 held that non-resident enemy aliens convicted of war crimes after 
321Michael Ratner, How We Closed the Guantanamo HIV Camp, supra note 15, at 
208-12.
322339 U.S. 763 (1950).
-118-
a military trial detained by the United States government outside the United States 
territory in time of war had no right or privilege to avail themselves of the jurisdiction of 
a United States court to challenge their detentions.
While the legal and political climate was bleak, the CCR attorneys believed that 
Johnson was distinguishable and that it was possible to win in court.  The CCR decided 
to take the risk.323  The government’s position was in clear violation of the Geneva 
Conventions and was in effect saying that no law applied to these detainees.  But the 
CCR’s objective went beyond winning or losing in court.  Its objective was to 
demonstrate that there was resistance to U.S. policy, to help publicize the injustice to and 
plight of the detainees, to keep the issue of the detainees in the public mind and to help 
use of the case as part of a broader political movement against the Administration’s anti-
terrorism policies.  The decision to litigate was not based on whether the CCR attorneys 
thought the litigation had a good chance of winning in court.
The CCR first filed a complaint with the Inter-American Commission of Human 
Rights of the Organization of American States, which ruled that the Guantanamo 
prisoners may not be held “entirely at the unfettered discretion of the United States 
government,” and that the government must accord those prisoners a hearing to 
determine their legal status under the Geneva Convention.324  The Bush Administration 
predictably refused to comply with the Commission’s ruling.  Indeed, given the certainty 
that the Administration would not comply with any unfavorable Commission ruling, the 
323Marcia Coyle, Taking the Risks:  Rights Center Tackles Guantanamo 
Detentions, NAT’L L.J., Feb. 26, 2004, at 1.
324Decision on Request for Precautionary Measures (Detainees at Guantanamo 
Bay, Cuba), Inter-Am. C.H.R. (Mar. 12, 2002), reprinted in 41 ILM 532, 533 (2002).
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purpose of the complaint was to obtain an authoritative ruling and to use that ruling to 
mobilize international and domestic public opinion against the Administration’s 
Guantanamo policies.
The CCR also brought a federal lawsuit on behalf of several of the detained 
prisoners.  The Federal District Court and then the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District 
of Columbia Circuit ruled unanimously in the government’s favor.325  Nonetheless, the 
CCR persisted, and the Supreme Court decided in November to hear its appeal.326
The Guantanamo case has already had an impact.  For almost two years now, it 
has helped keep the outrageous Guantanamo situation in the public eye and galvanized 
international protest.  News reports have sparked outrage at keeping the detainees in what 
British judges termed a “legal black hole.”327  Amicus briefs submitted to the Supreme 
Court from former federal judges, former senior American diplomats, former American 
POWs, former judge advocates general of the Navy and a top Marine Corps lawyers, the 
bar association representing the 54 nations of the former British Commonwealth, and the 
International Bar Association reflected and fanned the widespread protest against the 
325Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55 (D.D.C. 2002); Al Qaida et al. v. United 
States, 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
326124 S. Ct. 534 (2003).
327R. v. Sec’y of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, [2002] EWCA 
Civ. 1598 at ¶ 66.
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U.S. Guantanamo policy.328  That protest and the Supreme Court review has compelled 
the Administration to release a number of the prisoners.329
The question the case presents before the Supreme Court is very narrow and 
involves only whether federal courts have jurisdiction to consider the detention of foreign 
nationals captured abroad and held at Guantanamo Bay.330  Thus, at this stage of the 
litigation what is being requested of the Court is exceeding minimal:  namely a holding 
that federal courts have the jurisdiction to hear plaintiffs’ habeas petitions.  On remand, 
the District Court will determine what rights, if any, plaintiffs have, and what process, if 
any, they are entitled to.  At least theoretically, it is quite possible for the Supreme Court 
to hold that the lower courts have jurisdiction to review the plaintiffs’ case, but after 
remand for the courts to deny their habeas petition.
The Supreme Court’s assertion of jurisdiction to hear the case would be a 
tremendous victory for the plaintiffs.  First, it would articulate and give meaning to a 
fundamental constitutional principle; that Executive detentions of prisoners outside the 
United States cannot operate entirely outside the law nor without some legal process.  
Moreover, as with Judge Greene’s very different decision in Dellums, the Court’s mere 
assertion of jurisdiction in the Guantanamo case would affect governmental conduct.  
Indeed, the Supreme Court’s decision to hear the Guantanamo case has already had a 
dramatic impact on the government’s behavior, leading to the release of many prisoners 
328Douglas W. Cassell Jr., The Founding Fathers Knew Beller, CHI. DAILY LAW 
BULL., Oct. 17, 2003, at 6.
329Amy Waldman, Guantanamo and Jailers:  Mixed Review by Detainees, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 17, 204, at A6.
330Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 534 (2003).
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and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld’s decision that some process will be established to 
determine whether a prisoner should continue to be detained.331
Finally, the Guantanamo case also illustrates the limitations of litigation to 
transform the public dialogue.  For some of the lawyers at the Center for Constitutional 
Rights, the most fundamental issue involved in the case is the Executive’s use of the 
military, wartime paradigm to detain and prosecute people who should be prosecuted 
under civilian law.  They would want to challenge whether the “war against terrorism” 
really fits within the definition of a war, or should Al Qaida be treated as a criminal 
conspiracy and its members prosecuted under ordinary civilian war.332  But a challenge in 
the Guantanamo case to whether the war against Al Qaida is really a war for 
constitutional or international purposes would have almost no chance of success in the 
courts, therefore these attorneys are relegated to making that more fundamental point in 
their public speaking about the case, and not in the court.
The Guantanamo litigation is but a recent example of the long tradition in this 
country of using courts as one arena of protest.  That tradition needs to be cherished, 
protected and nourished.  We should not underestimate the power of the courts and of 
litigation to awaken the public’s conscience.  The political movements, individual 
litigants, judges and lawyers who use courts as a forum for protest play an essential role 
in enriching and vitalizing democracy.
331Secretary Rumsfeld, Remarks to Greater Miami Chamber of Commerce, 
Feb. 13, 2004, DoD News (“for those detainees who pose a continued threat and who do 
not need to be detained the U.S. government is instituting a process for an annual 
review”), available at http://www.dod.mil/faq/comment.html.
332The Executive’s position on the Guantanamo and other detainees suspected of 
Al Qaida ties is circular.  It invokes the laws of war as the framework to analyze their 
detentions and then argues that the protections of those laws contained in the Geneva 
Convention are liable because these prisoners are “unlawful combatants.”
